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A SMALL FLAW TRANSLATES INTO MANY MISCALCULATIONS:
A NARRATIVE CRITICISM OF THE INTEL PENTIUM CHIP CRISIS
Christine H. Hoelc, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2002
This study uses the Intel Pentium chip crisis of 1994 to gain an understanding
of how technology issues are socially constructed in contemporary American public
discourse. Two primary and competing narratives were discovered. First, Intel's
narrative minimized the problem and argued that chip flaws are commonplace and the
company would replace the chips for anyone who could "prove" the need for a
replacement. The consumer's narrative, conversely, was one in which customers
asserted that Intel's policy was paternalistic and instead demanded the replacement of
their chips. The narratives were analyzed as the crisis moved through five primary
events, with the crisis ultimately ending in Intel adopting a "no questions asked"
return policy and setting new industry standards for handling flaws.
This study argues that the Intel Pentium chip crisis is clearly a
transformational moment in American public discourse, validating the Internet as a
viable communications medium and demonstrating that its power lies it its ability to
create virtual activist communities of people who are connected through common
interests. The study concludes by offering suggestions on how to handle a crisis that
transpires as a result of the Internet.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In November 1994, Intel Corporation, a company known as the world's
dominant computer chip maker, experienced a crisis--its most anticipated and
highly promoted product, the new Pentium chip, was flawed. This would not be a
crisis if it were handled properly; however, it was not. In reality, Intel knew about
the flaw for months and kept quiet about it, believing that only a tiny fraction of
users would ever be affected by the problem and that the company could simply fix
the flaw in the next version of the chip (Jackson, 1997). Indeed, Intel's attempt to
minimize the issue angered customers, confused potential buyers, and concerned
investors, all of whom provoked an outcry of media attention, first via the Internet,
then computer publications, and finally the mainstream media.
Problems with Intel's Pentium chip were first reported via Internet
newsgroups frequented by heavy computer users (http://www.mathworks.com/
pentium/index.shtml). Newsgroups are cyberspace bulletin boards where messages
can be posted and virtual conversations can ensue. They accused the Pentium
processor of generating inaccurate results when users performed sophisticated
mathematical calculations. As the anger regarding the product flaw mounted in
cyberspace, the issue gained momentum via traditional media, which caused casual
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computer users to become aware of the problem and concemed that the Pentium
chip flaw might affect their own personal computers.
At first, Intel minimized the issue by stating that "the error is likely to occur
at a frequency 9f the order of once in nine billion divides" (A. Grove, personal
communication, November 27, 1994, � 7), or once in 27,000 years of average use.
Pentium chip users were not offered immediate product replacements and Intel
offered no product recall.
On December 12, 1994 computer giant IBM, usually an Intel ally,
announced it had stopped shipping personal computers using Intel's Pentium chip,
alleging that Intel had "significantly'' underestimated the potential for errors arising
out of the Pentium problem. Public confusion and skepticism were growing.
In effect, the story oflntel's public relations efforts was that there was
"much ado about nothing." The chipmaker's account of the facts was that it did
nothing wrang, taking a "we're innocent" posture and standing behind the idea that
flaws in technology are the "norm" for new software and hardware products. The
competing narrative of the consumer, "big companies don't care about the
customer," teils a different story. lt is easy to see that two different and opposing
narratives are revealed. However, only the narrative that rang true with key
constituencies would be the one that would gain currency during the heat of the
crisis. Consumers wanted unflawed, replacement Pentium chips without any
questions asked and without having to prove their case to Intel.
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This thesis examines the events surrounding the Intel crisis, the various
phases of the crisis, and the company's image restoration attempts. In so doing, it
analyzes the nature oflntel's rhetorical strategies and then evaluates the
effectiveness of those strategies. This thesis also will apply the narrative model of
criticism as a method to analyze the way in which the crisis was presented to the
public via the media. Chapter I provides the history of the Intel crisis.
Intel Crisis History
Today, scientists and engineers utilize computers to model their work. The
computers make millions ofcalculations every minute and are relied upon for
accuracy. Yet any type of inaccuracy can produce problems. The severity of a
problem is difficult to predict until something devastating occurs, especially if the
error goes undetected.
Imagine what would happen if an engineer conducting aerodynamic
simulations on a new car design was just tenths of an inch offbecause of an
unknown miscalculation. Potentially, millions of cars could be produced to those
specifications and cause problems for consumers. A small, undetected problem such
as decreased gas mileage or perhaps a more serious problem such as a car prone to
rolling over when driven at high speeds may be the result. What would happen if a
hospital nurse who was administering medication mixed the wrong percentages of
drugs due to a computer miscalculation? The result could be deadly.
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In December of 1993, Intel Corporation, the world's largest computer chip
manufacturer, introduced the much-anticipated Pentium chip, a central processing
unit (CPU), which serves as a computer's nerve center. The product's promise,
among other things, was to accurately calculate complicated mathematic equations
in the blink of an eye (Markoff, 1994b). Yet, this heavily advertised flagship product
feil short of its promise. Although minor flaws are not uncommon with new
technology releases, Intel did not respond to what it considered to be a minor flaw
until it was too late and a crisis was at hand.
Public awareness of the Pentium flaw began October 30, 1994 when
Professor Thomas Nicely ofLynchburg College in Virginia posted a message on the
Internet that described a bug he had found when conducting sophisticated
mathematical calculations in the course of his research.
lt appears that there is a bug in the floating point unit (numeric coprocessor)
of many, and perhaps all, Pentium processors. In short, the Pentium FPU is
returning erroneous values for certain division operations. For example,
1/824633702441.0 is calculated incorrectly (all digits beyond the eighth
significant digit are in error). This can be verified in compiled code, an
ordinary spreadsheet such as Quattro Pro or Excel, or even the Windows
calculator (use the scientific mode), by computing (824633702441.0)*
(1/824633702441.0), which should equal 1 exactly (within some extremely
small rounding error; in general, coprocessor results should contain 19
significant decimal digits). However, the Pentiums tested retumed
0.999999996274709702. (T. Nicely, personal communication, October 30,
1994, � 1-4)
According to Andy Grove, president oflntel, that is when "the hubbub started" (A.
Grove, personal communication, November 27, 1994, � 9). Others also posted their
experiences about how the Pentium chip was producing inaccurate calculations via
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Internet newsgroups and the issue began to gain awareness (The Mathworks Horne,

1994). From a public relations standpoint, Intel had a potential crisis brewing.
The New York Times broke the story in the general mass media on
November 24, 1994 in a lengthy article that described the Intel Pentium chip
problem in detail, concluding "an exclusive circuitry error is causing a chip used in
millions of computers to generate inaccurate results in certain rare cases" (Markoff,

1994a, p. D 1). In the article, Intel stated that it did not believe the chip needed to be
recalled because the average user would be unaffected by the error.
At first, Intel minimized the issue by stating that "the error is likely to occur
at a frequency of the order of once in nine billion divides" (A. Grove, personal
communication, November 27, 1994,, 7) or once in 27,000 years of average use.
Due to the low probability that users would experience calculation errors, and the
desire to avoid a costly product recall by generating general public awareness, Intel
President Andy Grove issued an apology via the Internet on November 27, 1994,
following the first press coverage and a month of �nternet discussions by potential
and existing chip users.
Grove's e-mail offered to replace the chip, but only for users who could
show that they were running programs likely to be affected by what had become
known as the "floating point error" (Yoder, 1994, p. B 1). In other words, Intel
expected customers to prove their need for a replacement chip. Additionally, those
reading the e-mail were skeptical that it was truly from Andy Grove because Richard

6

Wart, Intel's technology director, posted it on behalf ofGrove from his home on the
weekend.
Since the chip was used in almost every manufactured personal computer
(IBM, Dell, Compaq, Gateway 2000, and others), computer manufacturers had a
vested interest in any Pentium chip error. Manufacturers attempted to create their
own fixes to help users avoid encountering the problem. At a computer industry
conference, Compaq Computer Corporation's chief executive, Eckhard Pfeiffer, said
"his company planned to make available a software fix that would turn off the faulty
hardware. Giving the user a slower-but accurate---solution" (Markoff, 1994b,
p. D9). In the meantime, Intel was trying to wrap its arms around the crisis, even
going so far as to "gather a group of computer industry experts" to develop a way
for computers to detour around the bug (Markoff, 1994c, p. 41).
On December 12, 1994, computer giant IBM announced it had stopped
shipping personal computers using Intel's Pentium chip, alleging that Intel had
"significantly" underestimated the potential for errors arising out of the Pentium
problem. Intel's stock fell rapidly on the news of the announcement, forcing a
temporary halt to trading; when trading resumed, Intel stock was down more than
$2 a share in "very heavy trading of 16.2 million shares" (Ziegler & Clark, 1994,
pp. lA, l0A). Now there was skepticism in the public's mind about how often an
error might really occur-every 24 days or every 27,000 years? Intel was in the
midst of a public relations crisis of the first order.
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A wave of public anger began to build against Intel. Pentium chip owners
began filing lawsuits sighting securities fraud, false advertising, and the violation of
several state consumer-protection laws (Stipp, 1994). Intel's minimization strategy
no longer held the floodgates.
Finally, on December 21, 1994, after two months of stonewalling customers
with a stringent replacement policy, Intel announced a "no questions asked" retum
policy that would replace all flawed chips with an updated version of the Pentium
chip, and began to advertise its new policy in newspapers across the country. The
advertisement included instructions on how to receive an updated chip: "Those
interested in receiving an updated version of the microprocessor can call (800) 6288686" (Want Another Pentium?, 1994, p. D6). Investors responded favorably to this
announcement by sending the stock up $3.44 per share (Carlton & Yoder, 1994).
The crisis seemed to cease at this point and despite the two months of negative
headlines, Intel's reputation weathered the crisis without too much damage.
As an added measure of customer satisfaction and product assurance, Intel
introduced a worldwide network of Pentium-replacement service centers for retail
Pentium users and conducted intense one-on-one contact with corporate users
(Bemard, 1995). The company also established a toll-free hotline for customers who
wanted to install their own replacement chips. According to Dennis Carter, vice
president of marketing at Intel: "Our approach has been one-on-one, whether
they're large IT customers or individual users, and to deal with whatever issues or
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concems they have. We'll do education or arrange for them to replace the chips, if
that's what they choose" (Bemard, 1995, p. 32).
As

intriguing as the Intel crisis seems, there may be broader implications to

this crisis review. Perhaps corporations can use the Intel Pentium chip crisis as a
model to leam how not to respond to the negative consumer narrative as weil as a
reminder of the consumer's influence. Additionally, the Intel crisis serves as one of
the Intemet's hallmark stories in which the power of technology and people can
circumvent the traditional means of communication to be heard loudly and have
significant influence.
Chapter II will next provide a review of the crisis literature and an analysis of
potentially applicable crisis models to the Intel crisis.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Crisis Literature
The Intel Pentium chip crisis is clearly a transformational moment in
American public discourse. Due to irate customers using Internet newsgroups to
voice their complaints, this crisis was one of the first to gain momentum via the
Internet, prior to the mass media fanning any crisis flames via traditional media
outlets. Even though Intel is a computer technology manufacturer, it was not
prepared to deal with an Internet crisis. "Unfortunately for Intel Corporation, one of
its attempts at damage control was short-sighted and slow" (Basso, 1997, p. 29).
The crisis management Iiterature outlines the characteristics of a crisis
(Burson, 1985) and provides several models to explain how organizational crises go
through distinct phases.(Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980; Finlc, 1986;
Lukaszewski, 1987; Udwadia & Mitroff, 1991). The Iiterature also reveals a
plethora of defense, image restoration, and rhetorical strategies (Benoit & Brinson,
1994; Coomb, 1995; Fitzpatrick & Rubin, 1995; Johnson & Sellnow, 1995;
Reinhardt, 1987).
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Crisis Defined
A crisis results when publics are confronted with events that lead them to
feel uncertainty, concern, and even outrage with regard to some condition that
threatens their well-being and violates their expectations of responsible
organizational performance (Heath, 1997). Hay (1996) views crises as subjectively
defined conditions that are the connection to communication brought to life through
narrative and discourse. Each crisis is unique and peculiar (Meyers, 1986). Guth
(1995) compares the defining of crisis to that of defining art; both are indistinct "one person's incident may be another's crisis" (p. 125).
From an organizational perspective, Heath (1997) defines crisis as "an
untimely event that can be anticipated, that may prevent management from
accomplishing its efforts to create the understanding and satisfaction between their
organization and interested parties needed to negotiate the mutually beneficial
exchange of stakes" (p. 290).
Essentially, a crisis has the potential to disrupt business or completely
dismantle a business by creating unresolved problems between an organization and
its publics. Crises are characterized by events that threaten the basic values and
goals of an organization (Weick, 1988).
Meyers (1986) suggests that crises provide warning signs that changes are
needed within an organization. He challenges organizations to view crises as not all
bad stating that "a lot can be done during a crisis that would be difficult or
impossible to accomplish during a business-as-usual period" (p. 5). Contending that
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crises almost sneak-up in business, "assumptions have quietly eroded, undetected,
undennining the most carefully crafted (business) plan like sand that's been washed
from beneath a sea wall" (p. 9). In other words, a crisis can mount when an
organization is isolated and does not take the time to maintain the pulse on its issues
or publics, and it assumes that the business
environment has remained
unchanged.
.
.
One ofthe best-known models ofdefining a crisis was developed by
Hermann (1963, 1969, 1972). This model contends that there are three elements
which need to exist in order to create a crisis: (1) the threat, which is a potential
hindrance to some state or goal; (2) a short decision time to make an effective
choice to alter the course ofthe potential crisis; and (3) surprise, a lack ofawareness
on the part ofdecision makers that a crisis is about to occur.
Billings et al. (1980) build upon Hermann's crisis model (1963, 1969, 1972)
by adding a first step in the process ofdefining a crisis. The first step is known as
the trigger event. The trigger event occurs when "there is a gap perceived between
the existing state (initial state) ofan organization and a desired state (the goal)."
Billings et al. (1980) also examined crisis and the degree ofpotential impact it can
have on an organization. The degree ofcrisis is a function ofthe "perceived value of
possible loss, probability ofloss, and time sensitivity" (Billings et al., p. 304).
Three factors impact the probability ofloss. The first is the level of
confidence in the accuracy ofthe problem. The second factor that impacts the
probability ofloss is the number ofplausible explanations for the discrepancy. The
third and most important variable, according to Billings et al. (1980), is the response
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to uncertainty, meaning response to the degree of uncertainty feit about the
appropriateness of a response to the crisis. The last necessary variable presented in a
crisis by Billings et al. is time pressure. The Billings et al. model analyzes what could
be lost, what is likely to be lost, and the amount of time an organization has to react
before the problem transitions into a crisis.
Crisis Severity
The models developed by Herman (1963, 1969, 1972) and Billings et al.
(1980) help to define a crisis. In his model, Heath (1997) examines the severity of a
crisis. He contends that crises come in different degrees and contrasts the degrees of
crisis to the health of an organization:

Bed Rest: the crisis receives front pages, top-of-the-hour coverage. lt
attracts public attention but is unlikely to threaten the existence of the
organization even if the organization fails to strategically respond.
Medication: a type of crisis that requires an organization respond to media
inquiries and may even demand changes in operations to reduce the chance of
recurrence; explanation and sympathetic response as well as minor
operational changes are more than likely to be considered a sufficient
response to the crisis.
Chronic: a type of crisis that demands that the organization communicate
with the media and formulate changes that are implemented to prevent
recurrence. Without such a response, confidence in the organization and its
personnel is likely to diminish. Stakeholders will abandon the organization.
Fatal: a type of crisis that ends the existence of an organization because it
lacked the ability to restore faith with its stakeholders. (p. 291)
Heath's healthcare metaphor is very fitting. lt not only works as an analogy; the
state of the crisis could also be compared to the communication health of an
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organization. For example, an organization with poor communication health would
more than likely fall into the chronic or fatal degrees of crisis not only because of the
type of crisis, but because of its inability to respond and communicate about the
cns1s.
Crisis Responsibility
Conversely, Coombs (199 5) defines four organizational crisis contexts that
provide the source of responsibility and the degree to which it was the result of
intentional acts. The first context is afaux pas or social irresponsibility. In this
context critics accuse a company of violating current social norms. An illustrative
example are the accusations from critics that Camel cigarette brand uses the "Joe
Cool" advertising campaign to target/solicit teenagers and pre-teens into trying
cigarettes. The second context is that of an accident. Due to some unexpected act of
fate or product failure, an accident that harms people or habitat occurs. The third
context is terrorism. Here intentional actions designed to harm an organization are
taken. The intentional actions may include scandals, illegalities, product tampering,
or workplace violence that potentially sabotage an organization's reputation. One of
the most illustrative examples, which could be considered an intemal act of
terrorism, is the Enron scandal where the publicly traded energy brokerage firm
concealed significant financial problems, took funds from employee 401Ks, and was
forced to fire 4,000 employees and file bankruptcy in one day (case and details still
pending). The final context is transgressions. Coombs defines transgressions as an

14
organization that intentionally places the public at risk by knowingly selling
defective products, withholding safety information from authorities, and violating
laws. Hearit (1999) redefines Coombs' transgressions context into a more
understandable idea by succinctly categorizing it as product safety incidents.
For the purpose ofthis analysis focus will be given to transgressions. With
this type ofincident there is "some flaw in the design ofa product that causes, or
has the potential to cause, a great deal ofharm to the individuals and/or institutions"
(Hearit, 1999, p. 293). In this type ofsituation, users ofthe product or institution
become innocent victims, as was the case with Firestone tires in the year 2000.
The transgression crisis begins when an organization' s intentional actions
knowingly place publics at risk or harm, such as selling defective or dangerous
products. According to Coombs (1995), mortification strategies attempt to rectify
the situation. Mortification strategies are also attempts to build positive impressions
ofthe organization by recognizing the crisis in some way and attempting to atone
for the crisis.
Crisis Models
Researchers have examined organizational crisis developmentally to
understand the different stages it goes through and the strategies engaged at each
phase to combat the crisis. The following explores the various stages ofcrisis, the
crisis process, and methods for classifying crises.
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Crisis Stages
The aforementioned models help to define and categorize crises. Finlc, Beak,
and Taddeo (1971) analyze the stages an organization progresses through in a crisis.
They find that companies go through four distinct stages when hit with unexpected
tribulations: (1) shock, (2) defensive retreat, (3) acknowledgement, and (4)
adaptation and change. Finlc (1986) later defines the four distinct phases of crises
more clearly. The prodromal crisis is the warning stage. The acute state is otherwise
known as the point of no return (some damage has been done). The chronic stage,
also known as the clean-up phase, is where damage from the crisis is still being
managed, but business is trying to resume to some type of normalcy. And crisis

reso/ution is where things finally return to "normal."
Crisis Process
Finlc et al. (1971) examine the common responses of an organization to
crises. Meyers (1986) expands on Finlc et al. and examines the entire process of

crisis from the perspective of crisis manageability, providing a comprehensive view
of crisis. A managed crisis goes through a sequence of stages: pre-crisis (evidence,
acknowledgement, resolve), crisis (climax, assessment, direction), and post-crisis
(rebuilding, recovery, reform) (Meyers, 1986). With early detection and
intervention, the amount of organizational disruption can be reduced. But,
management must be committed to responding to early warning signs and it must
have a preliminary crisis team in place. An unmanaged crisis is like a disease that
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"works its way through the company' s system, undetected at first and possibly
resulting in radical change or elimination" (Meyers, 1986, p. 205).
Like other scholars such as Heath (1997), Meyers (1986) uses the medical
field as a mean� ofcomparison for the stages ofcrisis. However, his approach is to
apply the lessons ofthe medical :field as an example ofan excellent crisis

management system. The medical :field is a system that allocates scarce resources so
that the most good can be achieved.
Meyers (1986) categorizes business crises into nine distinct types: (1) public
perception, (2) sudden market shift, (3) product failure, (4) top management
succession, (5) cash, (6) industrial relations, (7) hostile takeover, (8) adverse
international events, and (9) regulation and deregulation. For the purpose ofthis
study, public perception and product failure are most relevant.
Public perception is when the way the world sees what is happening versus
the way the company sees it are at odds. Reality is socially constructed through
communication. So scientific facts or truths are no longer considered reality once
the public has grasped a different perception. With public perception there is
increased attention from the public sector, beyond which consumers or constituents,
industry regulators and public officials become involved.
The three most common reasons products fail are poor engineering, the
design fails to meet market demand, or the product design works initially and meets
market needs, but flaws become apparent after the product is distributed and used
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for an extended period oftime (Meyers, 1986). The way in which a company
responds to the product failure ultimately determines its ability to survive.
Beyond categorizing the type ofcrisis an organization may experience,
Meyers (1986) provides a formal method to classify and identify the gravity ofa
crisis. Four factors are involved in the classification ofa crisis: (1) dimension (the
size ofthe stake at risk), (2) control (the ability to influence the environment), (3)
time (how much time one has for maneuvering), and (4) options (the number and
quality ofone's choices). The relationship between the factors can help determine
what tools should be applied to the crisis.
Furthermore, Meyers (1986) offers a crisis classification grid to help
categorize the factors and how they relate (see Figure 1). The first step is to
examine the dimension and control factors. Assess the relationship between the
magnitude ofthe potential crisis and management's ability to influerice its
environment (i.e., prevent, control, contain, etc.). Meyers charts the factors on a
grid rating them along a scale ofO to 100. One hundred indicates that the "entire
company is exposed" to the crisis and "management has little or no control ofthe
forces behind the crisis" (p. 208), otherwise known as a Class A crisis, the most
serious crisis, on the Meyer grid. The Class B crisis is also serious, but management
is able to maintain some control over the situation. Class C implies that management
maintains a relatively high degree ofcontrol and that there is little danger.
According to Meyers (1986), crises situations are fluid and they move
through stages. He suggests that in order to manage a crisis successfully, an
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Figure 1. Meyers Classification Grid (Meyers, 1986, p. 208). Reprinted with
pemuss1on.
organization should plot where it is on the grid because each stage requires different
response options.
Meyers (1986) also suggests that top management only become involved
when a crisis reaches an "envelope of executive concem" (p. 211) because top
management cannot become involved in every potential crisis and still focus on
running the business. This envelope is just prior to the crisis reaching either Class A
or Class B (see Figure 2).

Time and options are also critical factors in a crisis situation. An
organization must assess how much time it has to respond to a crisis and what
options it has for responding. The less time and the fewer options an organization
has to respond with to a crisis, the more serious the trouble. The converse is true as
weil. Again, Meyers (1986) plots these factors on a grid to determine where and
how they interact (see Figures 3, 4, and 5). He also provides a diagram of the
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Figure 2. Meyers Envelope of Concern Grid (Meyers, 1986, p. 210). Reprinted with
penruss1on.
time-option factors "Jaws" interacting with the "envelope of executive concern" to
demonstrate how a crisis can be examined with all four factors in mind: control,
dimension, time, and options (p. 212). The worst crisis case is what Meyers calls
"double jeopardy" where there is very little time to react, management has few
options, potential for disaster is enormous, and management has almost no control.
Examination of the models helps to define crisis, depict the various degrees
of a crisis, provide contexts for crises, and formalize the process that a crisis moves
through by categorizing the process into stages. While most models contribute to
the understanding of one specific aspect of crisis, Meyers' ( 1986) provides the most
comprehensive examination. His model lends insight into the entire concept of crisis
and provides a road map even for a novice.
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Figure 3. Meyers Jaws I Grid (Meyers,
1986, p. 214). Reprinted with permission.

Figure 4. Meyers Jaws II Grid (Meyers,
1986, p. 214). Reprinted with permission.

Figure 5. Meyers Double Jeopardy Grid (Meyers, 1986, p. 215). Reprinted with
penruss1on.
Life Cycle of Public Issues
lt is interesting, and potentially relevant, to consider the life cycle of public
issues in the context of crises. Public issues, like some crises, deal with consumers
or publics and the influence they potentially have on an organization's behavior or
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the products produced. When consumers as a whole become unhappy with a
company, it is forced to change its existing behavior or potentially become extinct.
Often, out of those changes come new industry standards or even social change; the
Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Audi unintended acceleration crises are illustrative of
this point.
The stages of a public issue's life cycle are outlined by Post (1978). In stage
one, public issues begin their gestation when the expectations of a segment of the
public about the performance of a particular firm or industry are not met. A gap
forms between the actual performance of a corporation and public expectations
about what that performance should be. In stage two, new expectations become
successfully politicized. Stage three is the legislative phase, the response to
expectations and the change agent. The final phase of an issues life cycle is stage
four, the litigation phase where industry standards and practices are legally
changed.
Phases one and two fit weil within the context of the previously outlined
crises models, especially that ofMeyers (1986) which provides the category of
public perception crisis. Phases three and four are congruent with the post-crisis and
image restoration strategies.
Image Restoration and Apologia
"Image" is defined as the perception of a corporation held by the publics,
shaped by the actions of that corporation, as weil as by those of others (Benoit &
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Brinson, 1994). A good perception or "image" helps an organization maintain its
vitality or grow, while a negative perspective can be detrimental to the viability ofan
organization.
An apologia is a way for an organization to defend against charges of
wrongdoing (Hearit, 1994). An apologia is not an apology, though an apology may
be contained within the context; rather an apologia is the justification used by an
organization to explain its behavior. Apologia provide rebuttals or "counter
interpretations" ofthe "facts" that surround charges ofcorporate wrongdoing
(Hearit, p. 3).
The tradition ofapologia is grounded in the identification and evaluation of
strategies open to communicators during crisis, to repair an image, and to respond
to criticism or to accusations ofwrongdoing (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998).
Apologia tends to be employed as one ofthe first forms ofacknowledgment that a
crisis or wrongdoing has occurred.
Disassociation separates a relationship from a larger context (Ware &
Linkugel, 1973 ). lt attempts to safeguard the organization at the sacrifice ofa single
person or small group. For example, a disassociation ofan employee seeks to define
as distinct from its employer, Company X. An illustrative example ofdisassociation
can be seen in the Enron scandal of2001, when the company' s accounting firm,
Arthur Anderson, was accused ofshredding documents that would prove which
Enron executives were involved in concealing the company' s financial troubles.
Initially, Arthur Anderson attempted to disassociate itselffrom the Arthur Anderson
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team that worked on-site at Enron, claiming that Arthur Anderson was unaware of
that team' s actions. Disassociation, which is similar to scapegoating, can be used in
isolation or conjunction with apologia.
Hearit (1994) offers three primary disassociation strategies used by
corporations to restore their images: the denia/ stance which uses an
opinion/knowledge dissociation strategy-the classic Nixon response to the
Watergate scandal "I knew nothing"; the differentiation stance which uses an
individual/group dissociation strategy-otherwise known as the scapegoat
syndrome; and the exp/anation stance which uses an act/essence disassociation
strategy-"it was an accident."
Opinion/knowledge disassociation is an organization' s effort to deny guilt by
claiming that current discussions ofthe organization are mere "opinions" that do not
represent "actual knowledge" ofthe events that created the crisis. Such companies
dispute the charges and accuse them ofbeing groundless and not representative of
the facts (Hearit, 1994, p. 119). The classic scapegoat syndrome, otherwise known
as the individual/group disassociation strategy, is when corporations state that the
people or group involved in wrongdoing did so without the consent or knowledge
ofthe corporation. Act/essence disassociation is another disassociation strategy used
by corporations. In this approach, a corporation admits that the wrongdoing has
occurred, but contends that the act is not characteristic ofthe organizations "real
essence."
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Crisis Strategies
Researchers have examined how organizations respond to crises and what
strategies are implemented and when, seeking a repeatable, successful pattem. Once
an organization undergoes a threat to its reputation, pre-crisis, during, or post-crisis,
it often utilizes image restoration strategies as an attempt to maintain or restore its
image. There are various restoration strategies. Benoit and Brinson (1994), building
upon the work ofBurke (1970) and Ware and Linkugel (1973), offer an "integrated
typology offive broad discursive image restoration strategies: denial, avoiding
responsibility, minimization, mortification, and correction" (p. 77).
In 1986, car manufacturer Audi's unintended acceleration issue gained
national exposure due to a news segment appearing on the CBS television program

60 Minutes. The way in which Audi handled the crisis provides a real-life example
that can be applied to Benoit and Brinson's (1994) restoration strategy typology.
The first strategy is denial, where the accused refutes the accusations or
shifts blame. Initially, Audi stated that most documented acceleration problems
occurred with people 5' 6" and under, and who were mostly women. The company
blamed gender, not itself The second strategy, avoiding responsibility, occurs when
the accused does not deny the offense, but claims he or she is not responsible due to
someone else's action, a lack ofinformation, an accident, or committed with good
intentions. Next, Audi went so far as to recall floor mats to make them more secure
and prevent them from jamming under the pedal. Again, Audi did not want to

25
believe something was wrong with the engine; after all, Audi engines were the
differentiating factor against its competition.
The third strategy is an attempt to reduce the offensive nature of the act, in
effect reducing the damage to the organization's image. Benoit and Brinson (1994)
offer five variants to this strategy. First,. bolstering, which attempts to strengthen the
public's affect toward the accused, reducing negative feelings. Second, an
organization can attempt to minimize the unpleasantness of the offensive act. Third,
an organization may attack the accuser in an attempt to lessen the impact of the
accusation. Fourth, differentiation of the act from those of similar, but more
reprehensible nature may reduce the negative feelings. Finally, providing
compensation is a means to reduce the act's offensiveness. Initially, Audi appears to

have initially attacked the accusers and shifted the blame in an attempt to reduce the
offensive nature of the act, but later realized that it needed to combat the issue in

broader terms.
The fourth image restoration strategy may occur through mortification. This
strategy requires that an organization admit a wrongful act and ask forgiveness
(Burke, 1970). Image restoration may occur through the use of a fifth method,
co"ective action, in which the accused vows to fix the problem. Audi's multiple

attempts to fix the acceleration problem actually led to the implementation of several
industry standards including shift-lock technology which requires drivers to place
their foot on the brake before they can shift into reverse or drive.
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In conjunction with an organization developing a restoration strategy, there
is also a need for the veracity ofevidence: Is there proofofwhether or not a crisis
event occurred? Often, an organization will need to research the accusation to
determine its veracity - this is particularly true with product flaws. With other
types ofcrises, organizations tend to hide behind the auspices ofresearch to stall in
responding to accusations or to bide time. Coombs (1995) suggests that the crisis
response strategy must fit the damage done by the crisis. Severe damage requires
some form ofatonement by the organization.
An organization's performance history also can be a significant factor in a
crisis. lfan organization has a long, reputable, trustworthy history, it may weather a
crisis fairly weil. Coombs (1995) suggests that organizations with negative
performance histories utilize mortification strategies for the crisis. The mortification
strategies are remediation, repentance, and rectification. Remediation offers some
form ofcompensation or help to those who have been harmed. With repentance,
forgiveness is asked. Rectification involves taking steps to prevent the incident from
occurring in the future. All ofthese strategies make the organization atone for its
actions and show it is worthy ofpublic acceptance.
Issues Management
Since the late 1960s and the new socio-political dynamics, private companies
recognized their responsibility to the economic, social, environmental, and political
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arenas. With the publie as a watehdog, organizations realized the impaet oftheir
image, good or bad.
Issues management is an organization's Strategie use ofissues analysis and
strategie responses to help build mutually benefieial relationships within the
eommunities where the organization operates (Heath, 1997). Although
organizations may work to maintain a positive image, some must deal with the
negative impaet ofa erisis.
Several issues that transitioned into erises have taken eenter stage in the
publie spotlight. An organization's ability to survive the spotlight depends on its
ability to maintain or regain publie approval when faeing an issue that evolves into a
erisis. A positive example ofsurviving the spotlight is the Johnson & Johnson
Company and the Tylenol tampering erisis. Beeause ofthe seamless way Johnson &
Johnson handled the Tylenol erisis, where eapsules were eontaminated and human
vietims were involved, it was able to re-establish the Tylenol brand and may have
aetually even enhancedthe organization's publie image (Heath, 1990). The Exxon
Valdez erisis in 1989 also offers an example ofhow an organization's erisis eould
have damaged the eompany's image (Heath, 1990). The image did suffer
signifieantly due to the major oil spill into Prinee William Sound; however, beeause
Exxon aeeepted responsibility, the diseussions surrounding the erisis shifted to
polieies for the oil industry as a whole on hauling oil versus just foeusing on Exxon.
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Crisis Management
As

previously examined while reviewing Meyers (1986) model, crises can be

managed. The degree to which they are managed essentially determines an
organization's ability to exist. "Crisis management concentrates on those brief
moments of instability that must be dealt with first in order to get on with the larger
and less time-sensitive job of reaching strategic objectives" (Meyers, 1986, p. 205).
One of the primary objectives of crisis management is to maintain the public's
perception of the organization-the organization's image. The structural aspects of
crisis management are well-defined with guidelines on how to plan for a crisis and
whom to communicate with during the process (Burson, 1985; Lukaszewski, 1987;
Reinhardt, 1987; Udwadia & Mitroff, 1991). Time spent anticipating and planning
for potential disasters and crises can enable organizations to maintain their
reputations, credibility, and possibly even their market share during a crisis.
Observations
The review of the crisis literature has outlined the characteristics of a crisis
and provides several well-developed models to explain how organizational crises go
through distinct phases. The literature also reveals a plethora of defense, image
restoration, and rhetorical strategies that tel1 us a great deal about how
organizations can respond once a crisis has occurred. This thesis even offers the idea
that the Public Issue Life Cycle Model can be effectively applied to crises that use a
legislative outcome as a restoration strategy. Overall, this second chapter has
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provided a context for the Intel crisis analysis. However, what has been overlooked
in the crisis management literature is the idea that crises are, at root, stories, and
consequently, scholars have not examined crises from the perspective of narrative.
Also, the literature talks about the media as a vehicle for communicating about
crises, but the Internet as a communication medium and as a vehicle by which crises
are developed and resolved has not heretofore been explored. Therefore, this thesis
will explore the Intel crisis as a story, otherwise known as a narrative, and will
examine the role of the Internet as a communication channel during crisis.
Thesis Overview
Consequently, this study will examine the rhetorical strategies Intel
employed during the various phases of its product safety crisis. lt will apply the
narrative model of criticism as outlined by Foss (1989) as a method to analyze the
way in which the crisis was presented to the public via the media. The following
research questions will guide this study:
1. Using narrative criticisrn, how was the crisis presented to the public via
the media?
2. Using narrative criticism, what impact did the Internet play in
transforming consumer dissatisfaction into a serious public issue?
3. Using narrative criticism, what restoration strategies were successful in
helping Intel maintain its credibility in the industry?
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4. How should organizations address criticism that emanates from the
Internet?
Organization and Conclusion
-

As means ofjustifying and providing a context for this study, Chapter II has
reviewed the research on crisis communication from a process perspective. In doing
so, the characteristics ofa crisis and several crisis models were examined to explain
how organizational crises go through distinct phases. Also examined were various
defense, image restoration, and rhetorical strategies that organizations use during
and post-crisis. Chapter IIl will next provide an overview ofthe narrative literature
and the elements ofthe model. Chapter IV will then apply the crisis and narrative
models to the Intel crisis for examination and analysis, ultimately explicating the
research questions more fully. Chapter V will provide an interpretation ofthe
analysis as well as conclusions drawn from this study.

CHAPTERID

METHODOLOGY
Rhetoric
In order to understand the purpose ofrhetorical criticism, rhetoric must be
defined beyond a term that simply refers to meaningless statements or language
designed to hide the truth. Discourse is the purposeful and public attempt to
influence change. According to Cathcart (1981), rhetoric is a "communicator' s
intentional use oflanguage and other symbols to influence selected receivers to act,
believe, or feel the way the communicator desires in problematic situations" (p. 2).
lt is the purposeful and public attempt to influence change or persuade. The most
important point in this definition is that the communicator is intentional about the
language and symbols selected.
Hart (1990) provides an extensive view ofrhetoric by defining it,
demonstrating where it can be found, and the shape it takes. Additionally, Hart
describes what rhetoric does and how it functions in society. This perspective is
helpful to the rhetorical novice. He suggests that rhetoric unburdens the
communicator, allowing that person to speak his or her mind. Rhetoric distracts; for
example, media help to shape our views on specific issues not only by what is
reported, but what is not reported in regard to issues, distracting us from thinking or
knowing about the unreported portion ofthe issue. Rhetoric enlarges by either
31
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encouraging associations (i.e., the media often equates crime with large cities) or
disassociating ideas (i.e., cigarette manufacturers warn that smoking may be harmful
to one's health, but that cigarettes are not addictive). Rhetoric names, helping
listeners to become comfortable with new ideas and providing them with an
acceptable vocabulary (i.e., initially the war with Afghanistan was called the war of
"Enduring Freedom"; then it was renamed the "War on Terrorism"). Rhetoric
empowers by creating the ability to communicate ideas, beliefs, and ideologies,

effectively and persuasively. Finally, rhetoric elongates; it can stretch time, which is
important to those who seek patience or an idea of the future (i.e., a better time, a
world at peace, etc.).
Rhetorical Criticism
Rhetorical criticism is an investigation and assessment of discourse as a
means to understand the rhetorical process (Foss, 1989). There are many
communication lessons to be leamed from the process of rhetorical criticism.
Ultimately, the study of rhetoric improves future communication.
Scholars such as Foss (1989), Cathcart (1981), and Hart (1990) contend that
rhetorical criticism ultimately improves the effectiveness of communication by
generating ideas and theories about how communication can be enhanced.
Rhetorical criticism also provides a better understanding of the rhetorical process
and how it operates. Most importantly, it searches for the purpose of the specific
rhetoric and attempts to deterrnine if it was successful in meeting that purpose. For
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example, when President George W. Bush addressed the nation immediately
following the attacks on America on September 11, 2001, his purpose was not only
to inform the nation of the events that had transpired, but also to provide comfort to
the nation and assurance that someone would be held accountable for the tragedy. A
work of rhetorical criticism would analyze whether ot not President Bush was able
to meet his purpose using a process of critique.
In order for a critic to determine the effectiveness of rhetoric, he or she must
have established criteria to compare against. Critics have established multiple critical
standards to evaluate the rhetoric they have studied (Cathcart, 1981; Hart, 1990).
Cathcart (1981) offers a list of useful standards: results, truth, ethical, and artistic.
All are interrelated to the search for how to determine what is "worthy or effective
in human discourse" where nothing is absolute and there are no definitive measures
(p. 26).

The results standard, otherwise known as the false standard, assumes that
the purpose of the rhetorical message is to persuade the listener into doing or
believing what the communicator wants. Therefore, if the listeners provide the
intended result, then one can conclude that the message was effective.
This standard is simplistic, and when applied it presents two problems for the
critic. First, it is difficult to determine the exact results of the speech. For example,
an audience applauding could be interpreted as acceptance of the speaker's ideas.
Conversely, a lack of response could be interpreted as an unmotivated audience that
rejected the speaker's ideas, but in reality, the audience could just be tired or
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apathetic. lt also is difficult to distinguish between the short-tenn and long-tenn
results of the speech.
The second problem a critic faces is determining whether the observed
results were solely a product of the speech or influenced by other circumstances. For
example, when a speaker asks thos� in the audience to donate money, but no one
donates money, the speech could be interpreted as ineffective. Yet, the lack of
donations could simply be attributed to the fact that no one brought money with
them to the event.
The truth standard helps determine the effectiveness of rhetoric by how
much it establishes or furthers "truth." The basic premise is that people seek truth.
Therefore, a speech that upholds or reveals the truth is a good speech. Any speech
that falsifies or misleads is bad or ineffective. The basic problem with this standard is
knowing when the truth is being told. Another problem with the truth standard is
that it can force a critic to rank a speech as effective because the speaker is
searching for the truth, even though the speaker' s presentation could be poor and
the audience could be more confused afterwards than prior to listening to the
speaker.
The ethica/ standard questions the speaker's motives. "Is the speaker an
honest person and desires to uphold that which is good and noble, will he or she not
attempt to persuade people in that direction?" (Cathcart, 1981, p. 29). This standard
makes a speaker's personality, character, and motivation the standard ofjudgment.
Like the truth and ethical standards, this too looks outside the message to find some
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measurement ofeffectiveness. The results standard examines the audience response,
the truth standard looks at the rightness ofthe speaker, and the ethical standard
questions the speaker' s intentions.
The artistic standard judges the speech on how well the speaker applied the
principles ofeffective speech-making. This standard sets as its goal the ideal
performance ofart. Cathcart (1981) suggests that the artistic standard is the "most
useful standard for judging speech making" (p.29). This standard assumes that there
are principles ofrhetoric to guide communication efforts. lt also assumes that the
standards can be used either effectively or ineffectively, depending on a
communicator' s understanding ofthem. The principles acknowledge that truth is
more persuasive than falsehood; a credible speaker is more likely to be believed; and
that those who promote worthy goals will have more results that last longer.
Cathcart (1981) is careful to demonstrate how any one ofthese standards
used alone would not provide a complete or accurate criticism and each offers
pitfalls. But used together, these standards create a balance for judging truth, ethical
conduct, and justice, a standard triad for criticism.
Hart (1990) also provides a non-exhaustive, albeit brieflist ofstandards that
not only demonstrate ways to evaluate rhetoric, but also the tremendous variety of
approaches available to critics. He wams critics that any ofthe standards can be
applied foolishly or intelligently and suggests that said critics be judicious in their
application ofthese standards. Standards offered by Hart (1990) are as follows:
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1. The utilitarian standard: Did the message do what was intended?
Did people respond as the speaker hoped? Compared to others who spoke
on the topic, did the speaker do as well as could be expected?
2. The artistic standard Was the use oflanguage exceptional? Did
the message meet the highest standards ofbeauty and well-formedness? Did
it so stimulate the imagination that it brought new ideas to life?
3. The moral standard: This standard appears to be a combination of
the ethical and truth standards offered by Cathcart (1981). Did the message
advance "the good" and encourage public virtue? Did it meet acceptable
standards ofright and wrong?
4. The scientific standard: Did the message accurately represent
reality? Did the speaker' s arguments have a factual base and did conclusions
follow directly from the evidence presented? Could the claims in the message
be independently verified?
5. The historica/ standard: Was there anything in the message for
"the ages?" Is it likely that the ideas presented and the values endorsed will
outlast the speaker? Did the speech set processes in motion that resulted in
major changes?
6. The psychologica/ standard: Did the message purge the emotions
ofthe speaker or the audience? Did the speech present the opportunity to
calm important fears and anxieties? Were people so motivated by the speech
that social energy and personal commitments were renewed?
7. The politica/ standard: Did the message advance the goals ofthe
social groups the critic endorses? Will the "right" sort ofpeople be
advantaged by the speech? Will any harm be done to the most deserving
people in society because this speech was given? (p. 52)
Hart (1990) wams the critic not to simply judge something based on like or
dislike, but to explain the rationale for the like or dislike. A critic cannot flippantly
apply standards; "One must operate thoughtfully when choosing critical standards as
well as when deploying them" (p. 53).
Although the standards assume different category names, there is overlap
between the Cathcart (1981) and Hart (1990) list ofstandards. For example, both
evaluate the effectiveness ofthe communication based on the outcome. Was the
desired result achieved? Cathcart labels the standard that searches for
communication effectiveness the result standard while Hart calls it the utilitarian

37

standard. The foundation ofCathcart's result standard is persuasion. The standard
assumes that the communication must persuade the listener. Hart's utilitarian
standard is similar to Carthcart's result standard, in that it attempts to determine if
the message achieved the desired outcome; however, Hart goes beyond the idea that
the communication must be persuasive and looks at other factors that may affect the
acceptance ofthe message; factors such as speaker receptivity - how weil people
responded to the speaker and how weil the speaker presented the ideas. Overall,
then, Cathcart's standards provide a foundation upon which Hart expands.
These standards, regardless ofmethod, are applicable to narrative criticism.
Because most public communication could potentially be categorized as narrative;
however, a better understanding ofwhat narrative is and an examination ofnarrative
characteristics is warranted.
Narrative
A narrative is representative ofat least two events or situations in a time
sequence (Fass, 1989). Narratives order and present a view by describing a situation
that involves characters, actions, and settings that change over time. They are told in
a logical order in a continuum that is unproblematic, and the value ofnarrative is its
ability to help make sense ofreality (Mitchell, 1980).
Goodman (1980) offers three general questions that help to define the nature
ofnarrative. The questions are based on the presumption that narrative is valuable,
whether it imposes order on reality, or actually creates disorder (Mitchell, 1980).

38

First, what are basic requirements for narrativity? Second, how much distortion can
a narrative endure before it is transformed into something different? And finally,
what is the relationship between the different versions ofthe story? Like the
childhood game oftelephone, a message becomes distorted and changed after being
relayed multiple times. Narratologists seek to determirie the point in time in which a
narrative is most closely associated with the actual occurrence, but realize that no
event is witnessed or retold without personal interpretation or bias.
In "Telling America's Story: Narrative Form and the Reagan Presidency,"

Lewis (1989) demonstrates how well storytelling can capture attention and elude the
truth. Lewis' criticism ofReagan's presidency analyzes how Ronald Reagan became
known as the great communicator even though he had significant opposition to his
policies. The criticism identifies Reagan as being "unrealistic, simplistic, and
misinformed" (p. 280). Lewis' criticism using the narrative perspective illustrates
how Reagan's reputation, style, and the effect ofhis discourse are contradictory to
his actual presidency. The criticism provides a well-defined example ofhow to
examine a complex narrative that occurs over a significant period oftime. The
criticism examines the multiple forms ofnarrative used in Reagan's discourse to
explain his presidency and people's response to it as well as the consequences ofthe
narrative form itself When positioning Reagan as the storyteller and his message as
the story, Lewis concludes it is easy to understand his success. Overall, when
Reagan was seen in storyteller mode he gave "a clear, powerfi.JI, reassuring, and seif-
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justifying meaning to America' s public life" (p. 259). In the end, Lewis identifies
Reagan as having one narrative structure, the storyteller.
Lewis' (1989) criticism is relevant because it translates the theories of
narrative and storytelling, applying them to a real-life example. The criticism is also
beneficial because it is an example in which the media played a significant rote in
communicating the story.
Foss (1989) offers a three-step process for using a narrative paradigm to
help interpret reality. First, narratives define the central action of an experience.
Second, narratives help us decide what a particular experience is all about. Last,
narratives enable us to decipher information to determine the purpose. In order to
interpret reality, a critic must analyze the substance and form, and then critique the
narrative. The critic must consider both the factuality of the real events as well as
the possible moral and symbolic realities (Mitchell, 1980).
In the abstract, narration is the symbolic actions-words and or actions
that have a sequence and are meaningful for those who create, interpret, or even live
them (Fisher, 1987). Aristotle was the first to differentiate between technical and
rhetorical logic. Technical logic seeks true knowledge and is concemed with the
implications of the message. Rhetorical logic deals with probable knowledge and is
concemed with gaining an audience' s understanding. Aristotle made significant
contributions and is considered to be the father of rhetorical logic.
Fisher (1987) proposes the narrative paradigm that is deeply rooted in
Aristotelean thought. Fisher defines the paradigm as:
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A representation designed to formalize the structure ofa component of
experience and to direct understanding and inquiry into the nature and
functions ofthat experience - the experience ofhuman communication.
The narrative paradigm proposes the following: 1) humans are essentially
rational beings, 2) the paradigmatic discourse ofhuman decision making and
communications is argument; 3) the conduct ofargument is ruled by the
dictates ofsituations-legal, scientific, legislative, public, etc.; 4) rationality
is determined by subject-matter knowledge, argumentative ability, and skill
in employing the rules ofadvocacy in given fields; and, 5) the world is a set
oflogical puzzles that can be solved through appropriate analysis and
application ofreason. (p. 59)
Basically, the narrative paradigm proposes that human beings are storytellers who
have the natural ability to recognize the coherence and fidelity ofstories they tel1
(Fisher, 1987). Fisher contends that we experience life as a series ofongoing
narratives. The various modes ofcommunication can be seen as stories,
interpretations ofexperiences in sequences.
The principles ofcoherence and fidelity are imperative to the narrative
paradigm. Narrative coherence can be defined as the glue ofthe story. lt examines
the integrity ofthe entire story. Fisher (1987) offers an assessment model with three
factors for determining story coherence. The first coherence factor is structural
coherence; can holes be poked in the story? The second factor is material
coherence; is the information consistent with other related stories? The third factor
is characterologica/ coherence; thinking ofthe storyteller as the presenter, is the
presenter credible and believable?
Narrative fidelity is defined as the truthfulness ofthe story. Whereas
coherence examines the context ofthe whole story, fidelity examines individual
story components and whether or not the components "represent accurate assertions
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about social reality and thereby constitute good reasons for beliefor action" (Fisher,
1987, p. 105).
The reason that narratives work, advancing persuasion, is because they
disarm listeners by enchanting them, stirring listeners' experiences and emotions,
and they subtly present some sort ofreasoning or argument oflogic (Hart, 1990).
"Much ofpublic policy is determined by the stories persuaders tell" (Hart, p. 132).
Essentially rhetorical narrative is storytelling with a purpose.
The Conduct ofRhetorical Criticism
There is no single agreed upon method to conducting rhetorical criticism;
however, there are several general approaches that produce valid insights (Cathcart,
1981; Crable, 1986; Fisher, 1974, 1987; Foss, 1989; Hart, 1990). A critic examines
four variables ofany discourse: the speaker or source ofthe communication; the
discourse, speech, message; the environment, the context or situation where the
discourse occurred; and finally, the receivers or audience ofthe discourse.
There are some basic fundamentals or "tools" ofcritical methodology that
can be applied to rhetorical criticism (Cathcart, 1981). A critic's intent must be to
do more than just analyze content. The critic must try to decipher the meaning and
impact ofthe communication while taking into account all ofits complexities, relate
them to each other, and communicate the relationship. Cathcart offers four tools to
assist the critic in assessing the complexities ofthe rhetoric being analyzed. The
tools are: (1) observation, (2) analysis, (3) interpretation, and (4) evaluation.
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Observation is relatively objective; here the critic describes all the pertinent data.
Analysis, interpretation, and evaluation are judgmental and hence, more subjective.
The critic must use reason, draw conclusions, and apply values (Cathcart, 1981,

p. 22).
Foss (1989) offers a process for förmulating an essay ofcriticism. The 4-step
process is as follows: (1) discovery ofthe rhetorical artifact and research question,
(2) formulation ofthe critical method, (3) critical analysis ofthe artifact, and (4)
writing ofthe critical essay. This process seems to be fundamental to good research
and leaves the door open for critics to foster their own approaches when writing
criticisms.
Intel Narrative Analysis
This study uses the narrative analysis as a method ofrhetorical criticism that
analyzes messages as a way ofordering and presenting a view ofthe world through
a description ofa situation involving characters, actions, and settings that change
over time, as a way to critique the substance and form oflntel's response to the
product safety issue, as well as to evaluate the narrative (Foss, 1989).
Narrative Elements
The first step in this rhetorical criticism is identifying the data to be analyzed.
The data that form the basis for this analysis will be the initial posting from
Professor Thomas Nicely; and all the news stories regarding Intel and the Pentium
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chip flaw published between November 1994 and January 1995 collected from The

New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. Additionally, articles about the issue
in ComputerWor/d and EE Times, both ofwhich are trade computer publications,
were referenced.
The second step in this rhetorical criticism process is to develop a method
for analyzing the data. This analysis will make use ofan existing critical method by
applying the narrative method as a means to exam Intel's discourse.
This criticism will examine the Intel crisis as a narrative. In order to exam the
narrative, this criticism will exam many aspects ofthe crisis as communicated via the
various media aforementioned. This criticism assumes that there are two competing
narratives: first, Intel's narrative, and second, the consumer's narrative. The
criticism also will divide Intel's narrative into two parts: first, Intel's initial crisis
narrative, and then, Intel's post-crisis narrative.
The criticism will begin by analyzing the substance of the narrative (Foss,
1989). First, it will define the essence ofthe competing narratives and the events
that led to the occurrence ofthe narratives, examining the major events in the
narratives. Foss (1989) defines events as "actions, happenings, or changes ofstate,
some ofwhich are more important than others in a narrative" (p. 231). The events
ofa story are known as the plot (Chatman, 1978).
Continuing the analysis ofnarrative substance, an examination ofthe

primary characters involved in the narratives will be conducted as well as
identification ofthe primary target audiences, defining those who communicate in
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the narrative and whom they communicate toward. Third, the criticism will search
for potential cause-and-effect relationships and what effect those relationships have
on the narratives. Finally, the criticism will assess the platforms of the competing
na"atives as t(?ld by the characters and exam how the narratives change as the crisis
evolves through the different crisis phases.
Narrative Coherence, Fidelity, and Themes
After examining the elements of the narratives, the criticism will next
examine the story coherence of competing narratives using the three factors
provided by Fisher (1987): structural, material, and characterological, as well as
examining the narratives for .fidelity and repetition of themes. A cursory review of
the narratives reveals that the narratives do lack coherence at times, examining when
and how often lack of coherency occurs will be enlightening. Additionally,
determining what attempts to correct incoherence and how effective the attempts
are should also provide insight into the effectiveness of the narratives.
Narrative Impact
Third, this study will analyze lntel's narrative by applying the contemporary
utilitarian and resu/ts standards to determine the narrative's impact. Ultimately, the
narrative criticism will answer two questions: how was the crisis presented to the
public via the media? And, did the narratives have a long-term impact on Intel?
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Crisis Classification
Finally, as a way to help other organizations leam from Intel's crisis, this
criticism will attempt to plot the Intel crisis modeling Meyer's ( 1986) crisis
classification and identification of gravity system previously reviewed. The criticism
will plot significant points of the Intel crisis such as the first hint of crisis, Intel's
response to the first national media coverage, and Intel's decision to offer
replacement chips. Once these points of crisis are plotted, the real-life outcome will
be assessed in comparison to that which Meyers' model predicts.
Today, Intel remains a well-respected, industry leader; it is apparent that
Intel survived the Pentium chip crisis. Analyzing the Intel's actions throughout this
crisis and hypothesizing the effects of those actions on in Intel's industry position
today may serve as a positive model for other organizations that face similar
circumstances.
Organization and Conclusion
Chapter III has reviewed the narrative perspective literature and the elements
of the model. In doing so, it has formulated a narrative methodology for analyzing
the Intel crisis. Chapter IV will now apply the crisis and narrative model to the Intel
crisis for examination and analysis, ultimately explicating the research questions
more fully.

CHAPTERIV
ANALYSIS
On October 30, 1994, Dr. Thomas R. Nicely, Professor ofMathematics at
Lynchberg College in Lynchburg, Virginia, posted a message on theInternet
regarding a flaw he found in the first-ever piece of internal computer hardware
marketed toward the consumer, the Pentium chip, known as "IntelInside" to most
consumers. Nicely posted the following message:
lt appears that there is a bug in the floating point unit (numeric coprocessor)
of many, and perhaps all, Pentium processors.In short, the Pentium FPU is
returning erroneous values for certain division operations. F or example,
l/824633702441.0 is calculated incorrectly (all digits beyond the eighth
significant digit are in error). This can be verified in compiled code, an
ordinary spreadsheet such as Quattro Pro or Excel, or even Windows
calculator (use the scientific mode), by computing (824633702441.0)*
(1/824633703441.0), which should equal 1 exactly (within some extremely
small rounding error; in general, coprocessor results should contain 19
significant decimal digits).
I encountered erroneous results which were related to this bug as
long ago as June, 1994, but it was not until 19 October 1994 thatI feitI had
eliminated all other likely sources of error (software logic, compiler, chipset,
etc.).I contactedIntel Tech S upport regarding this bug on Monday 24
October (call reference number 51270). The contact person later reported
that the bug was observed on a 66-MHz system atIntel, but no further
information or explanation, other than the fact that no such bug had been
previously reported or observed. (T. Nicely, personal communication,
October, 30, 1994, ,r 1-4, 9)
Nicely' s post describes the Pentium chip flaw in detail and encourages others
to run their own tests using his source code and to report their findings to him. This
post is significant for two reasons: first, it is the " triggering event" of theIntel crisis;
46
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and, second, in a small way, it forms the beginning ofthe consumer narrative which
I will explicate here.
Within a month after Professor Nicely posted his discovery ofthe Pentium
chip flaw on the Internet, traditional media outlets discovered the Internet dialog
that was occurring and also began to report about Intel's Pentium chip flaw. By the
end ofNovember, the story had reached The New York Times; technology writer
John Markoff (1994a) reported: "An elusive circuitry error is causing a chip used in
millions ofcomputers to generate inaccurate results in certain rare cases,
heightening anxiety among many scientists and engineers who rely on their machines
for precise calculations" (p. D1). The technical computer press also was hot on the
story: "By last week, the Internet, which has become a de facto barometer on the
issue, was abuzz with talk ofusers returning flawed systems," wrote Jaikumar
Vijayan (1994, p. 1).
The Pentium chip flaw was rapidly transitioning from an internal product
flaw to a company crisis. According to Markoff (1994b): "For Intel, which has
spent millions ofdollars on an advertising campaign using the slogan 'Intel Inside,'
the news ofthe defect might create something ofa public relations problern"
(p. D1). This turned out to be an understatement.
The following analysis seeks to explore the narrative told within the context
ofthe Intel Pentium chip crisis. To this end, this chapter will fi.rst examine narrative
substance; second, it will apply the elements ofnarrative criticism to the significant
events ofthe crisis as a means ofsifting out the competing narratives for analysis;
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and, finally, it will attempt to plot the Intel crisis as a means of highlighting
significant crisis points in which decisions were made that ultimately affected its
resolution.
Narrative Substance, Narrative Characters, and Target Audiences
As a means of conducting an analysis of the narrative substance, it is
important to define the primary characters involved in the narratives, to identify the
primary target audiences, as well as to define who communicates in the narrative
and with whom they communicate.
The primary character of this crisis story is Andy Grove, CEO of Intel.
Grove communicates to two audiences� the first includes original equipment
manufacturers (OEM) that use the Pentium chip to manufacture their products (e.g.,
companies such as IBM, Dell, and Compaq). A second communication target for
Grove is best described as end-users (or chip users). I divided chip users into two
sub-groups. The first group is the general computer user, here termed the General
Consumer. The second group is scientists and engineers, here termed Techy
Consumer. At times, the sub-groups are referenced jointly as Computer Users. A
final target audience, but certainly not least important, is Grove's communications
with the media. At times, all of these Intel communication targets also create the
competing narrative(s), becoming characters of the narrative as well. Additionally,
media also act as a communication conduit for the narratives.
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A closer look at the target consumer groups' responses to the Pentium chip
flaw shows how Intel's initial communication attempts and crisis response strategies
were unsuccessful in relieving consumer angst. The target consumer groups can be
divided into two competing consumer narratives. First, the Techy Consumers who
expect to find flaws in new technology and understand that there will be interim
fixes or "band-aids." However, in this particular instance, the Techy Consumers
were angry that Intel was limiting who qualified for replacement chips. Vijayan
(1994) contended:
User anger continued to mount as Intel Corp. steadfastly stuck to its heavily
criticized policy of replacing buggy Pentium chips on a case-by-case basis.
Also raised was the possibility that a few users may file class-action lawsuits
ifintel does not redress the situation quickly. (p. 1)
Essentially, the Techy Consumers did not believe the policy was fair.
The second target is the General Consumers, who are not as familiar with
technology as are the Techy Consumers. In the Intel case, they were skeptical of
Intel' s assertion that the flaw would never affect their personal computers and were
angry that Intel would not replace their chips upon request. Markoff (1994d)
asserted:
Consumer products, once thought to be throwaway products that could be
made to lower technical tolerances than scientific and engineering gear, may
in fact have even more demanding specifications. Consumers have little
patience with the trouble-shooting, "bug fixes" and "software patches" that
computer professionals may be willing to take in digital stride. (p. D1)
Not only are these consumers demanding more from technology, they are
becoming more technologically savvy and expect technological products to be flaw
free just like any other product.
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The Essence ofNarratives
This analysis begins with a discussion ofthe narrative substance, which
examines the essence ofthe competing narratives and the events that led to the
occurrence ofthe narratives. There are five primary events that led to discernable
variation in the competing narratives: first, Intel's disclosure and minimization ofthe
flaw and the competing narrative; second, Intel's failed apology and the competing
narrative; third, IBM's counter-attack on Intel and Intel's competing narrative;
fourth, Intel's real apology and the competing narrative; and finally, Intel's
announcement ofa new policy for dealing with errors and any competing narrative.
Primary Event 1: Intel's Disclosure
The disclosure ofthe Pentium chip flaw occurred first on the Internet, then
in the trade media, and finally in traditional print and television media outlets. Intel's
initial narrative was developed as a response to the Techy Consumers who had been
commenting about Professor Nicely's October 1994 post regarding the Pentium chip
flaw. Intel responded to the Techy Consumers with an Internet post by Intel CEO
Andy Grove entitled, "My Perspective on Pentium," on November 27, 1994. The
post by Grove began, "I'd like to comment a bit on the conversations that have been
taking place here" and in the next paragraph it continues, "I read thru some ofthe
postings and it's clear that many ofyou [Techy Consumer] have done a lot ofwork
around it (the flaw) and that some ofyou are very angry at us" (A. Grove, personal
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communication, November 27, 1994, ,i 1-2). Out ofthe gate, Grove attempted to
capture the reader's attention through empathy.
Though it might have been done with good intentions, the post actually
created more s�epticism among users. This is because the post was sent from lntel's
Director ofTechnology, Richard Wirt's home computer. At the beginning ofthe
post it stated: "Andy Grove has asked me to post the following for him. Since it is
the weekend and we are out ofthe office, I am posting from my home system" (A.
Grove, personal communication, November 27, 1994, ,i 1). People may have had a
difficult time believing that the CEO ofa technology company would not have his
own home computer system. Also, readers might question Grove's decision not to
go into the office to post a message as important as this. More likely, however,
Grove's post may have been considered bogus due to the common and much
expected Internet fakery, and therefore, not considered relevant in its content.
Additionally, taken at face value, the tone ofthe e-mail was defensive and minimized
the situation. Grove's post is significant, one that has a profound influence on the
competing narratives, because it revealed that Intel knew about the flaw prior to
releasing the Pentium chip into the marketplace.
In an attempt to maintain its image and save face, Intel disclosed its
knowledge about the Pentium chip flaw following Professor Nicely's post, although
Intel had known about the flaw since June (Clark, 1994, p. A3). Benoit and Brinson
(1994) cite avoiding responsibility as an image restoration strategy, but in this case it
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appears that in order to maintain its credibility Intel had to tel1 the truth and take
responsibility.
In his post, Grove explained how the Pentium chip was produced and the
discovery ofthe flaw:
The Pentium processor was introduced into the market in May '93 after the
most extensive testing program we at Intel have ever embarked on. We held
the introduction ofthe chip several months in order to give them (OEM
customers) more time to check out the chip and their systems. We worked
extensively with many software companies to this end as well.
We were very pleased with the result. We ramped the processor
faster than any other in our history and encountered no significant problems
in the user community. Not that the chip was perfect; no chip ever is. From
time to time, we gathered up what problems we found and put into
production a new "stepping"-a new set ofmasks that incorporated
whatever we corrected. . . . After 25 years in the microprocessor business, I
have come to the conclusion that no microprocessor is ever perfect; theyjust
come closer to perfection with each stepping.
Then, in the summer of'94, in the process offurther testing (which
continued thru all this time and continues today), we came upon the floating
point error. We were puzzled as to why neither we nor anyone else had
encountered this earlier. We started a separate project, including
mathematicians and scientists who work for us in areas other than the
Pentium processor group to examine the nature ofthe problem.
This group concluded after months ofwork that ( 1) an error is only
likely to occur at a frequency ofthe order ofonce in nine billion random
floating point divides, and that (2) this many divides in all the programs they
evaluated (which included many scientific programs) would require elapsed
times ofuse that wöuld be longer than the mean time to failure ofthe
physical computer subsystems. (A. Grove, personal communication,
November 27, 1994, � 4-7)
lt is within these few paragraphs ofthe post that Intel's first narrative is introduced.
Intel's narrative can be summarized as the following: We created a better product
than before.

As

we've seen from experience, no chip is ever perfect so we weren't

surprised to find a few flaws. The floating point error won't happen often; therefore,
it's nothing to worry about. We'lljust fix it for our next release and not burden
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anyone with the details about it. Essentially, Intel believed that the flaw would do no
harm and that it could be repaired in newer versions ofthe chip. Communication
between the Techy Consumer and Intel was underway.
Up to this point, however, General Consumers were unaware ofthe Pentium
chip flaw. News about the flaw first appeared in mainstream print media via The

New York Times, on November 24, 1994, in an article entitled: "Flaw Undermines
Accuracy ofPentium Chips"; this notified General Consumers. lt is within the
context ofthe first print media report that the combined Computer Users' narrative
is represented. Markotf (1994a) wrote: "Some computer users said they believed
that Intel had not acted quickly enough after discovering the error'' (p. Dl). Others
quoted in the article gave voice to this point: "Intel has known about this since the
summer; why didn't they teil anyone?" said Andrew Schulman, the author ofa series
oftechnical books on PCs. "It's a hot issue, and I don't think they handled this very
weil'' (p. Dl). The public responded negatively to Intel's disclosure by heavily
trading Intel stock.
Cleve Moler, chairman and chiefscientist ofthe Mathworks, a software
company in Natick, Massachusetts, that develops mathematical software intoned:
"The issue is being sure that the arithmetic is right. There are enough other things
that can go wrong that I don't want to think about arithmetic" (Lewis, 1994, p. Dl).
David Bell, a researcher also voiced his concem: "The Pentium appeared as a cost
etfective means to do the kind ofanalytical computing that scientists and engineers
do. But when we hear and see that there are problems, that puts a question mark on
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the results" (p. Dl}. The underlying sentiments ofthe Computer User narrative
appear to be skepticism about the actual frequency that the flaw may occur versus
what Intel stated, and concem for their ability to rely on their computers to calculate
accurately.
As explored previously, organizations respond to crises with a variety of
strategies. Benoit and Brinson (1994) suggest minimization as a strategy used to
reduce the offensive nature ofan organization's act and to reduce the damage to an
organization's image. Intel utilized the minimization strategy when the company
publicly disclosed the Pentium chip flaw.
The first use ofminimization was targeted toward the Computer Techy via
Grove' s Internet post. The statement is as follows:
This group concluded after months ofwork that (1) an error is only likely to
occur at a frequency ofthe order ofonce in nine billion random floating
point divides, and that (2) this many divides in all the programs they
evaluated (which included many scientific programs) would require elapsed
times ofuse that would be longer than the mean time to failure ofthe
physical computer subsystems. In other words, the error rate a user might
see due to the floating point problem would be swamped by other known
computer failure mechanisms. This explained why nobody-not us, nor our
OEM customers, not the software vendors we worked with and not the
many individual users-had run into it. (A. Grove, personal communication,
November 27, 1994, � 7)
Intel continued to minimize the likelihood chip users would ever encounter
inaccurate calculations as a result ofthe chip's error, and therefore concluded for
average Computer Users that the error was ofno need for concem. This
minimization strategy and message was carried to the General Consumer as well via
the print media. Markoff argued:
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Intel said yesterday that it did not believe that the chip needed to be recalled,
asserting that the typical user would have but one chance in more than nine
billion ofencountering an inaccurate result as a consequence ofthe error,
and thus there was no noticeable consequences to users ofbusiness or home
computers. (1994a, p. DI)
Again, Intel's message was clear: the average user need not worry.
The consumer's perspective is again represented and the potential negative
impact that the Pentium chip flaw could have on Intel was communicated via The

New York Times Financial Desk ("Computer Stocks Tumble," 1994):
Although the flaw, which was disclosed last week, affects only complex
mathematical calculations, and will not affect most computer users, analysts
said that Intel's poor public relations in handling the error could cost some
computer makers that use the chip sales (p. D4)
Analysts were gearing up for the possibility that consumers were not going to
gamble on buying a product with a flaw.

As

one end-user stated: "'Intel is to be

faulted for their lack ofdisclosure rather than for the fault itself,' said W. Jerry
Saunders 3 "', chairman ofthe Advanced Micro Devices Corporation, Intel's chief
microprocessor rival" (Markoff, 1994b, p. D9). Perhaps consumers would have
thought nothing ofthe flaw had they heard about it from Intel first and immediately.
Intel continued to minimize the flaw:
Intel said yesterday that it did not believe the chip needed to be recalled,
asserting that the typical user would have but one chance in more than nine
billion ofencountering an inaccurate result as a consequence ofthe error.
(Markoff, 1994a, p. D1)
This quotation lends insight into Intel's narrative which remained: Most people
won't be affected by the flaw, so only those who can prove they use the chip in a
highly mathematical manner will be awarded a replacement. Meanwhile, Computer
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Users reacted negatively to not being informed about the flaw for months and the
potential that errors could occur versus the likelihood they would not, as Intel
continued to claim.
Interestingly, Intel seemed unsure how to handle the public relations crisis.
Markoff (1994b) wrote: "Intel said it would worry about how it had handled the
matter after it had finished dealing with the immediate consequences" (p. D9).
Howard High, an Intel spokesman, had this to say: "A few weeks from now we'll
see what we goofed up this time around. Now we're concentrating on mobilizing
the company and making sure all the people that need to be responded to get
handled quickly'' (p. D9). The comment from Intel's spokesperson led consumers to
believe Intel had goofed up several times and that the company was only concerned
with its existing customers, not potential ones.
Primary Event 2: Intel's Failed Apology
Apologia is a strategy used to respond to criticism or to accusations of
wrongdoing (Seeger et al., 1998). Apologia tends to be employed as one ofthe first
forms ofacknowledgment that a crisis or wrongdoing has occurred. The
aforementioned November 27, 1994 Internet post began with an apology from Andy
Grove, Intel CEO: "I am truly sorry for the anxiety created among you by our
floating point issue. It's clear that many ofyou have done a lot ofwork around it
and that some ofyou are very angry at us" (A. Grove, personal communication,
November 27, 1994, 11-2). lt is interesting to note that Grove apologized for the
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anxiety, not the actual flaw.This speaks to Intel's narrative that flaws are to be
expected in technology.
Toward the end ofthe post, Grove used a mortification strategy, offering a
second apology: "... and again please accept my apologies for the situation.We
appreciate your interest in the Pentium processor, and we remain dedicated to bring
it as close to perfection as possible" (A.Grove, personal communication, November
27, 1994, ,i 13).The second apology is an actual apology for the situation caused by
the flaw and it appears on the surface to be sincere. Theo Grove reminded readers
that no technology is ever perfect, once again stating the Intel narrative and
explaining that the flaw really is not all that unusual.
As an additional attempt to restore some oflntel's image, Grove utilized an
additional restoration strategy, corrective action.Within the post Grove offered

Computer Users a plan ofaction:
We would like to find all users ofthe Pentium processor who are engaged in
work involving heavy duty scientific/floating point calculations and solve
their problem in the most appropriate fashion, including, ifnecessary, by
replacing their chips with new ones. We don't know how to set precise rules
on this so we decided to do it thru individual discussions between each of
you and a technically trained Intel person. We set up 800# lines for that
purpose.lt is going to take us some time to work thru the calls we are
getting, but we will work through them. I would like to ask for your patience
here.(A.Grove, personal communication, November 27, 1994, ,i 11)
Intel assumes a very patemalistic rote by deciding which computer users will qualify
for a new chip and which will not.After all, because Grove's dialog is so vague, one
must question what standards a consumer would be judged against, and how each
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person's situation could possibly be judged equally without any stated standards to
be compared against.
In concluding his post, Grove reminded the reader that Intel would stand
behind the chip� for the life oftheir computers and offered yet another apology. This
time, the apology is for being long-winded and for the Pentium chip situation. The
last point potentially sours any attempt to build a rapport with the Techy Consumer.
Grove told the reader he "will continue to monitor communications," being a
watchdog ofsorts, but asks for forgiveness because he will not be able to "respond
to each communication individually'' (A. Grove, personal communication,
November 27, 1994, ,r 14). By telling the reader he may not respond, Grove
protected himselffrom any unspoken promises, but also made it clear that he was
too busy to respond, an obvious conclusion even the average consumer could make
without having to be told. Intel's narrative is apparent: the flaw will not affect many
users; therefore users must prove they need a replacement chip. Intel's replacement
policy became known as "we'II teil you ifyou need a new chip policy" (Fisher,
1994c, p. 6).
Intel's response to the Pentium chip crisis was slow. Grove's Internet post
came more than a week after Techy Users began to respond to Professor Nicely's
post. Grove's response positioned Intel's narrative for the duration ofthe crisis.
Two primary image restoration strategies were in use by Intel: first, minimization of
the frequency the flaw could occur; second, a weak corrective action strategy that
trivialized consumer concems by only offering replacement chips to those who could
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prove they were worthy. Ifintel had concluded consumer concems were relevant,
the company would have issued replacements to all those who requested one.
Additionally, Grove played down the fact that there were flaws by stating, "no chip
is ever perfect"; although this may be true, it did nothing to resolve the situation or
reduce anger (A. Grove, personal communication, November 27, 1994, ,r 5).
Primary Event 3: IBM's Counter-Attack
Initially, IBM responded to Intel's news about the Pentium chip flaw by
immediately announcing that it would be the first computer maker to replace
Pentium chips in its personal computers. Intel's Pentium chip flaw provided IBM
with a marketing opportunity because the company's Power PC chip competed with
the Pentium chip; therefore, IBM could offer that to customers instead of the
Pentium.
Additional announcements were made about IBM working with Intel to find
solutions for the Pentium chip flaw. Intel announced alliances with IBM, Compaq
and other customers to develop a software "patch," or small program, that could be
used as a rix for the Pentium chip floating point error flaw. lt appeared as though
IBM was trying to have it both ways by being supportive but also attempting to
capitalize on Intel's Pentium chip problems.
Then on December 12, 1994, IBM did a true about-face, and publicly
announced that it would stop selling all its personal computers that were using the

60
Intel Pentium chip because ofthe Pentium chip floating point error. Lewis (1994)
wrote:
Although the problem with Intel's chip, known as the Pentium, has been
widely publicized for more than a month, I.B.M. said it decided to halt
shipments at the height ofthe busiest season for personal computer sales
after determining that "risk oferror may be significantly higher'' for common
calculations than Intel has indicated. Intel has contended that the flaw, in the
part ofthe chip that performs mathematical division calculations, is so trivial
that an average person may encounter a problem once in 27,000 years of
normal use. But researchers at I.B.M. said yesterday that they had concluded
the flaw could arise as frequently as once every 24 days for an average user.
(p. Al)
Intel's credibility and narrative were in question. Intel had continued to minimize the
frequency that a flaw may occur, saying it would happen once every 27,000 years.
Now one ofits biggest customers and a well-known brand had attacked Intel's
assertions, claiming the flaw could show up as often as every 24 days. Intel would
need to respond.
Again consumer confidence in Intel was shaken; Intel shares fell $4.50, to
$58.25, before trading was halted at Intel's request so that it could respond to
IBM's announcement (Fisher, 1994a). In response to IBM and the Pentium chip
crisis, Intel took a defensive stance toward the accusation that it had considerably
underestimated the potential for errors from the Pentium chip.
Intel held a conference call with securities analysts and Grove questioned the
"validity ofl.B.M. 's testing methodology" (Fisher, 1994a, p. 8). Grove effectively
retorted with the idea that ifIBM's accusation was correct, the Pentium chip flaw or
miscalculation would have appeared thousands oftimes for users as weil as Intel
testers, which it had not. Intel hinted that the test conditions had been contrived
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(Ziegler & Clark, 1994, p. 1). Once Intel defended itselfagainst the accusations,
Intel shares rallied, down only $2.375 (Fisher, 1994a). According to Fisher (1994a):
"Andrew S. Grove, Intel's president and chiefexecutive, questioned the validity of
I.B.M.'s testing methodology as a substitute for real world use. 'Ifl.B.M.'s
contention was right, the problem would have shown up thousands oftimes; it
hasn't "' (p. D8). Intel's narrative remained the same and became even louder: the
flaw is minimal and Intel was standing behind its product.
On December 13, 1994, The Wall Street Jouma/'s response to Intel's
Pentium chip crisis narrative provided an interesting perspective. The article
highlighted how Intel had continued to belittle computer users concems by
continuously defending how minute the flaw was:
Intel detected the little noticed Pentium bug last summer but failed to issue a
recall or notify customers. lt grudgingly agreed to make repairs for a limited
number ofhard-core users after word got out - only to be pressured into
broadening the replacement program as press reports ofthe flaw multiplied.
(Ziegler & Clark, 1994, p. 1)
The article retorts Intel's stance by painting Intel's handling ofthe situation in a
poor light. lt accused Intel ofbeing pressured, not deciding on its own merits, to
provide a better replacement policy.
Interestingly, analysts came to the defense oflntel; one even called IBM's
announcement a "public relations ploy" (Fisher, 1994a, p. 8). lt appeared as though
analysts were continuing to rate Intel as a "buy" stock, calling the Pentium "a
temporary glitch" (Fisher, p. 8). One analyst speculated on the probability oflntel
undertaking a mass recall: "the likelihood ofa mass recall by Intel was extremely
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small, noting that there are more than three million Pentium machines in circulation
and that replacing every chip would cost about $2.5 billion. They can't do that."
(Fisher, p. 8). lt appeared as though the industry was not expecting much oflntel
either. Perhaps even the analysts believed that consumers were going to just have to
accept a flawed product.
Following IBM's announcement, the competing user's narrative was silently
affirmed when lntel's stock price began to plummet. Although The New York Times
did not focus on the Computer User narrative, The Wall Street Journal gave voice
to the Computer User's concems. Confused is a new descriptor for the Computer
User 's narrative, and is most applicable to the General Consumer. Ziegler and Clark

(1994) wrote:
Consumers, especially thousands shopping for a harne PC to wrap up under
the Christmas tree in the next two weeks, may have a difficult time deciding
who to believe. The dispute pits IBM - a much-humbled computer giant
but one that still wields considerable credibility and has one ofthe nation's
best research labs - against Intel, a high-tech star that has spent tens of
millions ofdollars this year burning its name into the TV sets and minds of
U.S. consumers. (p. 1)
This confused Computer User 's narrative is confirmed in several newspapers
articles. Headlines read: "The Pentium Proposition: To Buy or Not to Buy?"
(Yoder, 1994, p. B7); "Windows or Mac? Pentium or 486? Now or never? Buying a
personal computer has never been simple" (Fisher, 1994b, p. D1). So ifthe General
Consumer ever feit confused or intimidated about purchasing technology prior to

the Pentium chip problem, buying a computer bad just become even more confusing.
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Then, of course, there were the jokes that confirmed the Computer Users
narrative and demonstrated a way for the powerless to strike at the powerful.
Question: How many Pentium designers does it take to screw in a light
bulb?
Answer: 1.99904274017. That's close enough for nontechnical people.
Q:
A:

What are the leading new names for the Pentium?
Aprroxium, Almostium, byslexium.

Q:

What's another name for the "Intel Inside" sticker they put on
Pentiums?
Warning label. ("Take My Pentium Chip," 1994, p. 11)

A:

By this point, Computer Users did not want to hear about the probability that a flaw
might occur; they just wanted Intel to make the problem go away by offering to
replace the chips at any cost.
On December 12, 1994, The Wall Street Journal reported that consumers
had filed multiple lawsuits against Intel. The lawsuits accused Intel of many
misdeeds, including "securities fraud, false advertising and violation of several state
consumer-protection laws" (Schmidt, 1994, p. B4). These suits, along with the
jokes, and falling fourth-quarter profits for Intel, shouted the Computer User
narrative: we expect something more; we want new chips.
Primary Event 4: Intel's Real Apology
With the significant impact of the IBM announcement, and after weeks of
what appeared to be stonewalling, on December 20, 1994, Intel reluctantly
capitulated to the consumer narrative, offering to replace all flawed chips; "no
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questions asked." Intel explained its decision in an advertisement published
December 21, 1994 in The Wall Street Journal. The announcement is as follows:
To owners ofPentium (Processor-based computers and the PC community):
We at Intel wish to sincerely apologize for our handling ofthe
recently publicized Pentium processor flaw.
The Intel Inside® symbol means that your computer has a
microprocessor second to none in quality and performance. Thousands of
Intel employees work very hard to ensure that this is true. But no
microprocessor is ever perfect.
What Intel continues to believe is technically an extremely minor
problem has taken on a life ofits own. Although Intel firmly stands behind
the quality ofthe current version ofthe Pentium processor, we recognize
that many users have concems.
We want to resolve these concems.
Intel will exchange the current version ofthe Pentium processor for
an updated version, in which this floating point divide flaw is corrected, for
any owner who requests it, free ofany charge anytime during the life oftheir
computer. Just call 1-800-628-8686. (Grove, Barrett, & Moore, 1994,
p. A7)
While Intel had changed its stance and accepted the core ofthe Consumer' s
narrative, the printed apology was remarkably similar to that originally posted on
line. Again, Intel repeated its original narrative, minimizing the need for concem and
still taking a patemalistic stance. The apology never once demonstrated an
understanding ofthe users' concems; it simply acknowledged that users had
concems. Intel continued to position itselfand its products as technology superior
with the caveat that technology always has flaws. "The Intel Inside® symbol means
that your computer has a microprocessor second to none in quality and
performance" (Grove et al., 1994, p. A7).
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The content ofthe advertisement demonstrates a heavy emphasis on the
aforementioned image restoration strategy ofcorrective action. As the Intel
advertisement stated:
We want to resolve these concems. Intel will exchange the current version of
the Pentium processor for an updated version, in which this floating point
divide flaw is corrected, for any owner who requests it, free ofany charge
anytime during the life oftheir computer" (Grove et al., 1994, p. A7)
Although it would take time for Intel to make replacement chips widely available,
the announcement had an immediate impact: it brought the crisis to an end.
The competing Computer User narrative is ultimately what compelled Intel
into offering a "no questions asked" retum policy. "Humble Pie: Intel to Replace Its
Pentium Chips" was the headline on December 21, 1994 in The Wall Street Journal
(Carlton & Yoder, 1994, p. BI). Yet, even when it announced its new retum policy,
Intel continued to minimize the situation, "The past few weeks have been deeply
troubling," said Andrew Grove, Intel's chiefexecutive officer, in a prepared
statement. "What we viewed as an extremely minor technical problem has taken on a
life ofits own." To "support" Intel's PC manufactures, "we are today announcing a
no-questions asked retum policy" (Carlton & Yoder, p. BI). In other words, even in
announcing its new retum policy, the company continued to maintain that there
really was nothing substantively wrong with the Pentium chip and that the
consumer' s reaction was really "much ado about nothing." In executing the recall,
Intel managed to maintain the company's financial stability and withstand the
crisis-despite the critics' predictions, as is evidenced by the fact that once the no-
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questions-asked retum policy was announced Intel's stock went up $3.4375
(Carlton & Yoder, 1994).
Intel customers essentially demanded the corrective action. According to
Clark (1994):
While it originally limited replacement chips to users involved in
sophisticated calculations, any customer who insists on a replacement is
getting one, said Crag Barrett, Intel's chief operating officer. The tacit
change füllows liberal retum policies announced earlier by some computer
makers that buy Pentium chips. (p. A3)
The article continued by speaking on behalf of the consumer:
Though Intel is now getting better reviews on the Internet discussion groups
that were slamming the company, the move hasn't quieted critics. Eric
Jansen, an analyst with Alex.Brown, said it took him a Jot of persistence and
50 minutes on the phone to get approval für a new chip. "To put somebody
through 50 minutes of intimidating, evasive discussion in my mind is an
undue qualification process," said Mr. Jansen. (Clark, 1994, p. A3)
Intel had been fürced into adopting a corrective action strategy.

Computer Users did not care about Intel's prediction für how frequently the
flaw might occur; they wanted a product which was free of flaws because that is
what they believed they purchased. The füllowing quotation summarizes Computer

User 's expectations:
Whether a Pentium-based computer stumbles once every 27,000 years, as
Intel says, or as often as once every 24 days, as I.B.M. says, goes to the
heart of the company's reputation as a quality manufacturer. And yet the
problem has few parallels in marketing. After all, no one will die or become
ill from a division error made by a Pentium-based computer. On the other
hand, people have a right to expect that a very expensive machine, für which
specific claims of quality are made, performs properly. (Ramirez, 1994,
p. D18)
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The combined Computer Users' narrative is simple: we want new chips because the
current chips do not live up to the promises Intel had made about them.
Primary Event 5: New Policy für Errors
After Intel announced its "no questions asked" retum policy, the crisis
ceased and the issue disappeared from mainstream media until late January when
Intel disclosed a new procedure für informing its customers and the public about
flaws in its chips. In the future, after Intel identifies and documents a flaw, it will
disclose the flaw first to its customers, and then to the public via addendums to the
design handbooks für each ofits chips. Intel will also maintain its toll-free customer
service number. In the future, Intel promised to disclose flaws as they are füund and
analyzed, letting consumers decide für themselves whether they need replacement
chips (Markoff, 1995g, p. D4).
Cause-and-Effect Relationships
There are several cause-and-effect relationships that become apparent as the
substance ofthe narratives is examined. The most obvious is the relationship
between Intel and its Computer Users. But that relationship needs to be broken
down into each type ofconsumer and examined further.
The cause-and-effect relationship between the General Consumer and Intel
is the most demanding. The General Consumer is not accustomed to dealing with
technical manufacturers and the converse is true as well. General Consumers expect

68
companies to stand behind their products and right something that is wrong, or even
potentially wrong. Markoff (1994d) demonstrated this point when he wrote:
"Consumers have little patience with the trouble-shooting, 'bug fixes' and 'software
patches' that computer professionals may be willing to take in digital stride" (p. D5).
The ultimate cause-and-effect oflntel's unwillingness to recognize the General

Consumers expectations and Intel's refusal to offer replacement chips is ultimately
what perpetuated the Pentium chip crisis into the spotlight for weeks. An editorial
by Mossberg (1994) demonstrated the realities ofthe General Consumer's
perspective:
Intel has spent the past few years running a massive consumer advertising
campaign designed to make its name and the name ofits high-powered
Pentium chip household words. But over the past month, when it was forced
to disclose a defect in the Pentium chip that causes it to do some math
calculations wrong, Intel has done virtually nothing to reach out directly to
that same mass audience ofgarden-variety computer owners in homes and
small businesses. lt has directly contacted technical and scientific users, big
companies, computer retailers. lt has issued press releases and held
telephone conferences with Wall Street analysts. But it hasn't run any mass
market print or TV ads explaining the situation or publicizing the toll-free
phone number it has set up for concemed Pentium users. Worse, Intel has
taken the position that, for the kind ofcomputing most ofus plain folks do, a
defective Pentium is good enough. (p. B1)
The Computer User narrative was spoken clearly: Intel does not care about us. Intel
has marketed to us and sold us on its product, but now it will not stand behind it.
Intel does not appear to be "walking the talk."
The cause-and-effect relationship between Intel and the Techy Consumer is
typically that ofunderstanding and trust. Although the Techy Consumer might have
been impacted by the flaw, awareness ofthe possibility is typically enough for the
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Techy. The Techy may even attempt to find a fix for the flaw him- or herself But
such was not the case: the Pentium Techy Consumer was angry. ComputerWorld
Magazine reported:
The Internet, which has become a de facto barometer on the issue, was
abuzz with talk ofusers returning flawed systems. Also raised was the
possibility that a few users would file class-action lawsuits ifIntel does not
redress the situation-and quickly. (Vijayan, 1994, p. 1)
The Internet provided the Techy Consumer with a place to vent frustrations, but
also a place to discover how others were handling the flaw and how Intel was
responding. Techy Consumers wanted everyone to be treated equally; one Techy
was not more in need ofa replacement than another.
There is also a cause-and-effect relationship between all ofthe Computer
Users. lt is the unified voice ofthe Computer Users that is heard the loudest in the
narrative. Perhaps it is the combination ofunderstanding, apathy, anger,
conservation, and intolerance which enabled the narrative to build slowly, allowing
Intel to stonewall on issuing a "no questions asked" policy a few months after the
flaw was announced instead ofimmediately being called to action. Interestingly,
upon Intel's announcement ofits new "no questions asked" policy, computer
retailers commented that any hostility generated from the Pentium flaw would be
quickly forgotten (Markoff, 1994f, p. A l).
Media and the Computer User are entwined in a cause-and-effect
relationship. At times, media represent the Computer User' s voice; at others it is a
Computer User. Yet it also needs to be "unbiased" and present the story,
"objectively" representing Intel's story, too. Media provide a podium for which
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Computer Users can be heard. Conversely, the Internet is an independent medium

providing 24 hour, 7 days-a-week, opportunities to converse about the issue and not
only be heard, but also to potentially provide a means for a response or reaction.
Without the Internet as a medium, this crisis may have been avoided because
Professor Nicely' s post would not have been available for public consumption. The
Internet provides a self-controlled method of disseminating a message, but does not
allow for a controlled response. Intel discovered this with Grove' s post on
November 27, 1994.
Media and Intel are another cause-and-effect relationship to be considered.
Traditional media have the opportunity to be an advocate of consumer rights. Media
have the ability to cast a positive or negative light on the Intel Pentium chip crisis
with editorial comment and interviews. Intel is reliant upon traditional media to
carry the company' s message to the consumer. The traditional media is obligated,
through accepted journalistic conventions and professional ethics, to tel1 the story.
Foundations ofNarratives
Intel' s narrative remained essentially the same throughout the crisis. lt is best
summarized by Flynn (1994):
Despite several thousand phone calls a day, Intel continues to say that
concern about the Pentium chip is overblown, that the glitch affects only
those users performing certain higWy complex mathematical calculations,
and that the computer user would encounter it only once in 27,000 years of
average use. (p. D1)
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The company minimized the frequency that the flaw was likely to occur, causing
mathematical errors, and it continued to trivialize consumers' concems by claiming
only people performing sophisticated mathematical functions should worry. Even
when the company announced its new retum policy, it continued to minimize the
situation, "The past few weeks have been deeply troubling," said Andrew Grove,
Intel's chief executive officer, in a prepared statement. "What we viewed as an
extremely minor technical problem has taken on a life of its own" (Carlton & Yoder,
p. Bl). To "support" Intel's PC manufacturers, "we are today announcing a no
questions asked retum policy" (p. Bl). The sincerity behind Grove's words is
believable; its obvious he has been troubled, but it appears as though he still cannot
comprehend why consumers are demanding flawless chips. The following statement
from the advertisement demonstrates this point. The advertisement states:
The Intel Inside� symbol means that your computer has a microprocessor
second to none in quality and performance. What Intel continues to believe is
technically an extremely minor problem has taken on a life of its own.
Although Intel firmly stands behind the quality of the current version of the
Pentium processor, we recognize that many users have concems. (Grove
et al., 1994, p. A7)
The two competing consumer narratives of the General Consumer and the

Techy Consumer were unique, but only when taken together as the Computer User
narrative did they have the most significant impact. In summary, the Computer User
narrative evolved from skepticism that Intel was being honest about how frequently
the problem would occur and anger that Intel refused to offer customers
replacements, to confusion about who to trust, and finally, anger at Intel and the
company' s lack of regard for the non-technical consumer. Ultimately and
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begrudgingly, Intel was forced to accept the Computer User narrative and offer a
"no questions asked" retum policy.
Narrative Coherence, Fidelity, and Themes
When examining the Intel Pentium chip crisis in the narrative paradigm, it is
essential to examine the principles of coherence and fidelity. Story coherence is the
glue of the story and is composed of three factors: structural, material, and
characterological coherence (Fisher, 1987). Structural coherence examines the
story for merit, searching for any holes. Intel's story regarding the Pentium chip flaw
does not appear to have any structural problems. What appears to be the problem is
that Intel' s narrative is incongruent with that of the Computer User 's narrative.
Additionally, both entities desired a different outcome. Intel only wanted to replace
chips for Techy Consumers who really needed the chip to perform at a high level,
while the General Consumers wanted new chips even if they only planned to play
video games on their computers.
· Material coherence searches for information consistency in relation to other
stories. When IBM announced it would halt shipments of computers with the
Pentium chip because IBM had discovered conflicting test results about the
frequency that mathematical errors were likely to occur due to Intel's Pentium chip
flaw, material coherence oflntel's story was tested. Although wounded, Intel's
story remained materially coherent because IBM's move was credited by some as a
"public relations ploy" and Intel had logically argued that ifIBM's tests were
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accurate, the flaw would have appeared a thousand times over (Fisher, 1994a,
p. D8).
Characterological coherence looks at the storyteller as the presenter
searching for credibility and believability. There are multiple storytellers to the Intel
crisis. The most obvious would be Andy Grove, Intel's CEO. Overall, he appeared
knowledgeable and confident, but seemed to instantaneously lose credibility when he
revealed that Intel knew about the flaw for months and never publicly disclosed
information about it.
Having only come forward after Professor Nicely' s post made Intel appear
as if it was trying to hide the flaw and waiting until the update to announce the
problem. Grove stuck to his story throughout the crisis, maintaining that the flaw
was minimal and it would not affect many users. This consistency adds to the
coherence oflntel's story.
While story coherence examines the context of the whole story, fidelity
examines individual story components and whether or not the components
"represent accurate assertions about social reality and thereby constitute good
reasons for belief or action" (Fisher, 1987, p. 105). Reality is socially constructed
through communication. So scientific facts or truths are no longer "the reality" once
the public has grasped a different perception. With Intel, once IBM announced its
findings that the error occurred more frequently, Intel's singular "scientific truth"
now faced a competing "scientific truth." Lewis (1994) wrote:
I.B.M. said it decided to halt shipments at the height of the busiest season
for personal computer sales after determining that "risk of error may be

74
significantly higher'' for common calculations than Intel has indicated. Intel
has contended that the flaw, in the part ofthe chip that performs
mathematical division calculations, is so trivial that an average person may
encounter a problem once in 27,000 years ofnormal use. But researchers at
I.B.M. said yesterday that they had concluded the flaw could arise as
frequently as once every 24 days for an average user. (p. Al)
With two "scientific truths" open to debate, Computer Users were left confused and
more concemed about the reliability oftheir Pentium chips.
With IBM's announcement, public perception had changed and a competing
reality had set in. Additionally, Intel's continuous focus on its reality that the flaw
would not affect many users weakened the story that the consumer heard. In a
sense, Computer Users may have stopped listening to the redundant explanation
because it was not an acceptable solution for consumers. Intel's story did not seem
to "add up" for Computer Users any longer. The reality ofthe situation was that the
product was flawed and could potentially cause problems; therefore, the product
needed to be replaced-no questions asked.
Recurring Themes
There are two primary themes that reoccur throughout the Intel narrative.
The first was that oflntel: the Pentium chip flaw would not affect many users. The
second theme is that consumers expect Intel to replace faulty chips.
There are two underlying themes in the Intel narrative as weil. The first is
that technology is never perfect. As far as new technology products go, problems
with the Pentium are the kind ofbugs that computer-chip designers expect with each
new generation oftechnology. But this time, the personal computer has become
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more significant in both work and life, and Intel's own marketing efforts have put
technology in the consumer spotlight ofdemand (Markoff, 1994d). The second is
that when a product is heavily marketed, it has a reputation to uphold. While
consumers were demanding "Intel Inside" due to the successful marketing
campaign, Intel was unprepared for the realities ofbeing a committed consumer
goods provider when the reality ofthe situation conflicted with its marketing efforts
(Markoff, 1994d).
Narrative Impact
In order to assess the impact ofthe entire narrative and the effectiveness of
the rhetoric, the Intel Pentium chip story will be applied against two contemporary
standards: the utilitarian and the result standard The utilitarian standard assesses if
the message did what it was intended, ifpeople responded as desired, and how well
the speaker did regarding the topic and in comparison to others who spoke on the
same topic. When comparing Intel's efforts against the utilitarian standard, how the
crisis was presented to the public via the media will be taken into consideration.
With the cost ofa recall estimated at approximately "$2. 5 billion" and Intel's
beliefthat the Pentium chip floating point error would -cause problems only once in
27,000 years ofaverage use, Intel's message intent was to reduce concem and
minimize fear that the Pentium chip flaw could cause any significant damage to the
average user (Lewis, 1994, p. Al). However, the Computer Users did not answer
Intel's narrative about the flaw with a lackadaisical response. Instead, they
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interpreted Andy Grove's comments to be arrogant and uncaring, while the
company's continuous attempts to minimize the situation only angered Computer
Users further. Fisher (1994b) wrote:
For small businesses, though, the problems have already occurred, and some
were venting their anger yesterday on the Internet, the global web of
computer networks. "I can't believe that Intel says it's not that important to
most users," wrote Joey Jarosz, who identified himselfas the president of
Hot-N-GUI Inc., a Silicon Valley software consulting company. "I use my
Pentium machine-or I used to till yesterday-to do my company's
bookkeeping. I don't think the I.R.S. would accept 'My Pentium made me
do it."' (p. D1)
Computer Users were angry at Intel for assuming that they would simply accept the
flaw and Intel's assertion that the average user would remain unaffected. Again,
Intel appeared paternalistic while belittling the worries ofthe Computer User.
Although the speaker, Andy Grove, was clear and consistent in his message,
he was unable to dissuade consumers from their original demand ofwanting
replacement chips. In fact, as Grove continued to hammer his point ofview,
Computer Users grew more steadfast in their demands. Proofofthis can be found in
the falling stock price, IBM's decision to decline to ship computers with the
Pentium chip, and the General Consumer 's expressed concerns about buying new
computers, as well as existing Computer Users who expressed anger about the
situation via the Internet and/or filed lawsuits. On December 16, 1994, The Wall
Street Journal reported that multiple lawsuits were being filed against Intel, while
the company continued to debate the significance ofthe flaw. The lawsuits accused
Intel ofmany misdeeds including "securities fraud, false advertising and violation of
several state consumer-protection laws" (Schmidt, 1994, p. B4).
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Traditional media played a significant rote as the consumer' s informant. Both
The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal editorialized the story, allowing
the consumer's perspective to be heard as weil as playing a significant rote in helping
to shape their opinion. The traditional media also was the cause for alarm, or the
"Chicken Little" ofthe situation, using headlines and lead paragraphs that
perpetuated consumer's anger. Even the adjectives media used tended to create a
worrisome context (i.e., public relations nightmare, heightening anxiety, damage
the credibility, confusion, knowing who to believe, etc.).
The Intel Pentium chip crisis is one ofthe first to be initiated in cyberspace.
The Internet as a medium was a catalyst for the crisis. The Internet also became the
"water cooler" for conversations by users. This relatively new medium provided a
new forum for dissatisfied consumers to vent to each other and learn from one
another. "The Internet, which has become a de facto barometer on the issue, was
abuzz with talk ofusers returning flawed systems" (Vijayan, 1994, p. 1). Intel's lack
luster attempt to jump into the discussions as a means to provide resolution only
added to the dissention. Intel's credibility was further reduced by Grove's use ofa
different e-mail address as was the message penetration due to the perceived
"fakery" ofthe message.
Overall, Intel failed to meet the Utilitarian Standard The company's initial
message was that the average Pentium chip user did not need to be concerned about
the flaw because he or she would more than likely never be affected by it; it did not
calm angry consumers, reduce the likelihood ofa recall or replacement program, or
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provide a better understanding. As for the speaker, consumers did not respond
positively to Grove's message because he did not adapt his message to meet their
needs. Instead, he continued to communicate the same message and appeared as
though he was not listening to the consumer's concems. Therefore, it can be
concluded that Grove did not do as weil as was expected, and the unnecessary crisis
is proof Clark (1994) wrote:
Intel's stance doesn't surprise analysts who know Mr. Grove, a 58-year-old
Hungarian immigrant and expert in semiconductor processes. An engaging
man with an academic bent, Mr. Grove teaches graduate classes in
management at Stanford University. He is also known as a combative,
stubbom boss, traits that may have inclined him to stick to his own course
when dealing with the Pentium flap. (Clark, 1994, p. A3)
Knowing more about the man behind Intel lends insight into the driving force behind
Intel's narrative. lt seems natural that someone who has a reputation for being
stubbom would allow a crisis to unnecessarily escalate and continue just to get the
point across that most people will be unaffected by the flaw.
The result standard, otherwise known as the false standard, assumes that the
purpose of the rhetorical message is to persuade the listener into doing or believing
what the communicator wants. Intel's narrative was simple: the average Pentium
chip user did not need to be concemed about the flaw because he or she will more
than likely never be affected by it. This narrative was communicated repeatedly. The
purpose behind it was to reduce Computer User concem and to eliminate the need
for what Intel considered to be unnecessary product retums. In the end, when
applying the resu/t standard against Intel's narrative, it is easy to detennine it failed
to meet this standard as weil when comparing it to Intel's desire to avoid having to
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replace all Pentium chips. Intel was not able to persuade Computer Users into
believing that the flaw was nothing to worry about. Nor was Intel able to prevent
Computer Users from demanding replacements. Intel abruptly reversed course and
announced it w:ould offer all customers a free replacement Pentium chip upon
request. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that listeners· (the Computer User) did not
provide the intended result oflntel and Intel's narrative was ineffective. However,
Intel managed to maintain its financial stability, the stock market responded
favorably to Intel's new "no questions asked" retum policy. The company's stock
was up $3.4375 to $61.25 a share (Carlton, 1994, p. BI).
There are two implications oflntel's narrative and the competing narrative
worth noting. For Intel, to assume that everyone, including General Consumers who
bad never been exposed to the process of technology, would accept the idea that
technology is always flawed rendered its narrative ineffective. For the Computer
User, it was important that Intel understand it was not the issue of probability that
Computer Users were concemed about, it was Intel's lack of understanding for the
Computer User's rationality.
As a way to further understand the Intel Pentium chip crisis and examine it in
relation to the context of crisis classification, I will now assess the crisis in
accordance to Meyer's (1986) classification system. The purpose in doing so is to
demonstrate how a non-essential crisis can escalate into a situation which may
threaten an organization's ability to conduct "business as usual" and to determine at
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which point Intel's crisis moved beyond management's ability to influence the
outcome aside from capitulating to the consumer's demands.
Crisis Classification
Meyer (1986) provides nine distinct types ofbusiness crisis categories. The
two that are most applicable to Intel's crisis are product failure and public
perception. lt is almost intuitive to understand why product failure applies. Initially,
the Pentium chip met or exceeded market demands, but once the flaw was
discovered consumers were unwilling to accept the product as it was.
Public perception, on the other hand, is a more illusive crisis category.
Essentially, public perception can be defined as how the consumers viewed the
Pentium chip flaw versus the competing reality - users would more than likely
never be affected by the flaw. As consumer anger and concem increased, public
perception became incongruent with Intel's reality that the flaw was so minimal that
it would occur once every 27,000 years for the average consumer. Computer Users
did not care how minimal their chances ofbeing affected by the error were� they
wanted the odds to be zero. Iflntel had recognized the incongruence in public
perception early on, the crisis could have been prevented or the duration reduced.
As previously reviewed, Meyers (1986) provides a theoretically
comprehensive means for examining crises by helping to categorize them as weil as
to identify their potential gravity. Categorizing and plotting the Intel crisis may
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provide other organizations with insight into the appropriate time to adapt narrative
to meet Computer User needs.
Plotting begins by first applying the dimension and control factors to the
Intel crisis. These factors examine the relationship between the magnitude ofthe
potential crisis (the dimension axis) and Intel management's ability_ to influence its
environment (i.e., prevent, contain, control, etc.-the control axis). The grid rates
the dimensions along a scale ofO to 100. The less "control" and more "dimension"
equates with the idea that there is less that management can control and there is
more that is at stake. As noted earlier, crisis situations are fluid and can move
through stages. Intel has three significant moves on the dimensionlcontrolfactor
grid.

First, when Intel knew about the flaw intemally, prior to Professor Nicely's
post, and had the opportunity to choose disclosure, the company was in quadrant C.
Class C is a high degree ofmanagement control and relatively little danger. Second,
after Nicely's post, Grove's post stating that it is policy to replace chips on an "as
needed" basis, Intel moved into Class B-the crisis stakes were rising, but
management was still able to affect the company's fate. Although Intel never feil
into the brevity ofClass A-where its existence was threatened and management
could do little to influence the outcome-because it changed its retum policy, it
came close to losing credibility. Had Intel not been one ofthe few rnicroprocessor
providers, it may have fallen into Class A. Figure 6 diagrams Intel's crisis
progress1on.
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Figure 6. Intel Crisis Plotted on Meyers (1986) Classification Grid.
Finally, according to Meyers (1986), it is important to determine when
management should become involved in a crisis. When a crisis approaches either
zero or 100 on the control axis, it is pointless for management to become involved
because it literally has no influence on the outcome. However, the "envelope of
concern," those crises which fall within the zero to 25 range on the dimension axis,
is the point at which management should become involved. Meyers categorizes the
envelope as just prior to the crisis reaching either Class A or Class B. Because
lntel's CEO, Andy Grove, appeared involved in the crisis from the first company
Internet post forward, it is safe to assume that the crisis reached an "envelope of
executive concem." Figure 7 highlights Intel's position within the "envelope."
Meyer ( 1986) recommends that the CEO and top management concentrate
their efforts on an even smaller portion of the "envelope of concem" that he names
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Figure 7. Intel Crisis Plotted on Meyer's (1986) Envelope ofConcem Grid.
the "Jaws ofCrisis." When a company is within the "Jaws ofCrisis," the CEO and
management should focus solely on the crisis at hand. When applying Meyer's
theory to Intel, Intel was in the "Jaws ofCrisis" as is evidenced by Grove as the
spokesperson throughout the entire crisis. However, the fact that the first initial post
may have not originated from him suggests some room for interpretation at this
point. The risks were high; Intel realized that its highest profile product was in
question and the impact of the crisis could be significant.
Looking beyond dimension and control to the other two forces of crisis,

time and options, the Intel crisis can be assessed further. Intel took approximately
six weeks to rescind its retum policy from a "user you must prove it" stance to a "no
questions asked" retum policy. Though Intel had time to respond, it did not have
many options. Intel did take its time in responding, but perhaps it was that time
which propelled the crisis further. Iflntel had recognized early on that it had only
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one response to the crisis which would be acceptable to consumers, a "no questions
asked" policy, it could have reduced its response time and ultimately its time in the
spotlight. The shaded area in Figure 8 emphasizes Intel's position in accordance to
the time and response options the company was up against.

Figure 8. Intel Crisis Plotted on Meyers (1986) Jaws II Grid.
Organization and Conclusion
By examining the Intel crisis through the lens of a narrative critic, multiple
narratives were discovered. The media through which the stories traveled also
provided avenues for narrative exploration, determining if the intended messages
actually transcended the potential clutter of media noise to be interpreted by the
receiver as the sender had intended. The Internet provided a new form of media, one
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that allowed interactive communication like never before among those who had a
stake in the Pentium chip crisis. This crisis appears to be one of the first
communicated through this medium. Chapter V next assesses these observations
further, lending a critical eye not only to the discoveries of the narrative criticism, as
weil as drawing a number of conclusions vis a vis the nature of technology issues in
this socio-cultural milieu.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
A crisis results when key institutional publics are confronted with events that
lead them to feel uncertain, concern, and even outrage with regard to some
condition that threatens their well-being and violates their expectations of
responsible organizational performance (Heath, 1997). With its considerable
violation ofconsumer expectations, the Intel Pentium chip controversy was one
such crisis. The product did not meet its marketed promise and consumers were
angry at the flippant approach Intel used as an attempt to rectify the situation. For
Intel, the Pentium chip flaw evolved into a non-essential crisis. Given Intel' s prior
knowledge ofthe flaw, the company missed its opportunity to manage and
proactively prepare to handle the issue that could have ultimately avoided a crisis.
In order to understand how corporations respond to crises, this thesis first
reviewed research on crisis communication from a process perspective. From that
review, an examination ofcrisis characteristics and several crisis models revealed
how organizational crises go through distinct phases, as weil as the various defense,
image restoration, and rhetorical strategies that organizations use during and post
crisis. After reviewing the crisis literature, this thesis then examined the Intel
Pentium chip controversy in an attempt to analyze how the crisis transpired, how it
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was managed and responded to, and the outcome of the crisis for those involved. In
so doing, this thesis attempted to answer the following four research questions:
1. Using narrative criticism, how was the crisis presented to the public via
the media?
2. Using narrative criticism, what impact did the Internet play in
transforming consumer dissatisfaction into a serious public issue?
3. Using narrative criticism, what restoration strategies were successful in
helping Intel maintain its credibility in the industry?
4. How should organizations address criticism that emanates from the
Internet?
In the end, the Pentium chip crisis has had no long-term negative effects on
those involved. Intel is still revered as the world' s dominate computer chip-maker
and consumers are now purchasing the Pentium 4 chips. The significance of the Intel
Pentium chip crisis is contained within the lessons that can be learned from the
actions and events that occurred. This chapter sets out to examine those lessons
while answering the questions that guided this thesis.
Primary Crisis Narratives via the Media
Chapter IV analyzed the Intel crisis from a communication perspective using
the narrative criticism method. The chapter answers question one of this thesis,
which asks: Using narrative criticism, how was the crisis presented to the public via
the media? Intel's initial narrative was to minimize the likelihood that average chip
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users would ever encounter calculations errors. Due to this minimal risk, Intel only
offered to replace chips for those users who could prove their use involved
sophisticated mathematical work. Intel's initial narrative was developed in response
to the Techy Consumers who had been responding to Professor Nicely's October
1994 post regarding the Pentium chip flaw. Intel's initial narrative can be
summarized as follows: We created a better product than before.

As we've

seen

from experience, no chip is ever perfect so we weren't surprised to find a few flaws.
The floating point error won't happen often; therefore, it's nothing to worry about.
We'll just fix it for our next release and not tel1 anyone about it.
The Consumer Narrative, conversely, was divided into two sub-groups; first,
the Techy Consumers which is comprised ofscientists and engineers whose work
with computers goes beyond the fundamentals ofsoftware programs, e-mail, and the
Internet. The second group is the General Consumers; this group is comprised ofall
general users, those who do not fit within the Techy Consumer group. At times, the
sub-groups are referred to jointly as Computer Users.
The Techy Consumer's narrative was one ofanger. Intel's policy of
replacing flawed Pentium chips on a case-by-case basis had angered this group of
consumers who were typically understanding oftechnology's flaws. Intel appeared
to be playing unfairly. The Techy Consumers wanted everyone to be treated equally
and held to the same standards. They believed and communicated that Intel was
acting patemalistically by deciding which Techy Consumer 's work was more
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sophisticated and warranted a new chip. To top it all off, Intel did not have a set
standard of measurement to determine which chips warranted replacement.
The General Consumer 's narrative was one of skepticism and intolerance.
After learning that Intel had only come forward about the flaw following Professor
Nicely' s Internet post, General Consumers were left to wonder what eise Intel
might have to hide. Intel had invested a significant amount of money in marketing
the Pentium chip to the General Consumer and now those consumers were
questioning the company and its credibility. General Consumers also became
intolerant with Intel. Intel's replacement policy was not the standard consumers
were accustomed to� typically a flawed product was recalled without question� now

Computer Users had to prove they were worthy of a new Pentium chip.
Intel's patemalistic stance was negatively impacting both the Techy and

General Consumer narratives. Intel's replacement policy was essentially
communicating to Techy Consumers that Intel had the power and authority to
decide who and when to provide replacement chips.

As for the General Consumer,

Intel's patemalistic stance and narrative attempted to continually define when

General Consumers should worry about the flaw. Intel believed that General
Consumers need not worry at all because the company knew how minimal the risk
was and General Consumers should trust lntel's projections. Additionally, Intel's
late disclosure of the flaw added to its patemalistic stance. After all, Intel did not
think General Consumers needed to know because the flaw would never affect
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them. Finally, the patemalistic stance was also a veil, causing consumers to wonder
what else Intel might be hiding.
As the crisis progressed, Intel moved through the various stages ofcrisis as
outlined by Finlc (1986). The prodromal state is the waming stage; this occurred for
Intel with the Internet postings in response to Nicely' s· post. The acute state is
otherwise known as the "point ofno retum" (where some damage has been done);
this began with the first traditional media coverage ofthe Pentium chip flaw in The

New York Times. The chronic stage, also known as the clean-up phase, is where
damage from the crisis is still being managed, but a company or business is trying to
resume some type ofnormalcy. Intel was entering this stage prior to IBM's
announcement that it would stop shipping computers which had the Pentium chip.

Crisis resolution is where things finally retum to "normal." This stage began after
Intel first apologized and then acknowledged the folly ofits attempt to require
consumers to prove their need for a replacement chip and instead announced its "no
questions asked" policy. While Fink's model is designed to assess what is occurring
to an organization as it progresses through the various stages ofa crisis, it is
interesting to couple the Fink model with narrative criticism to examine what
occurred to Intel's narrative as weil as the competing narratives at each ofthe
respective stages.
Essentially, Intel' s narrative was constant from the Prodromal Stage through
the Chronic Stage. The company minimized the potential that flaw would affect the
average user and it trivialized consumer concems by only offering to replace
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Pentium chips for those users who qualified. The Techy Consumer 's narrative
evolved as the crisis moved through the stages from an understanding that
technology is often flawed, to anger, to demanding new chips. The General
Consumer 's narrative also evolved as the crisis progressed through the stages from
being unaware ofthe flaw, to skepticism as to the accuracy oflntel's projections of
how often the flaw occurs, then to anger about the replacement policy, to finally
demanding new chips. lt is at the crisis resolution stage that the Techy Consumer,
General Consumer, and Intel narratives became one voice. Table 1 diagrams the
evolution ofthe three narratives.
Over the next two months, the crisis continued to gain media coverage.

As

the crisis progressed, the combined Computer User influence and narrative became
evident as lawsuits were filed, Intel became the butt ofmany jokes, and the
company's fourth-quarter profits fell. Computer Users expected more from Intel
than a wishy-washy retum policy; they wanted new chips with no questions asked. lt
is my opinion that the media perpetuated the Intel Pentium chip problem into a
crisis. However, it was Intel's naive approach to consumer public relations that
continued to propel the crisis into the spotlight weeks beyond necessity. Media
found in the Intel and Computer User statements a narrative tailor-made for
"consumer beware" front-page coverage.

Table 1
Intel Consumer Targets Narrative Evolution
Acute
Stage

Internet Postings

First Media Coverage

Chronic
Sta2e

Intel Narrative

Minimized potential
for flaw. Dismissive
ofconcems.

Minimized potential for
flaw. Trivialized
consumers' concems.

Continued Media IBM's
Announcement
Minimized potential for
flaw. Trivialized
consumers' concems.

General Consumer
Narrative

Unaware

Skeptical that the flaw
would happen as
infrequently as Intel
stated. Angry Intel
didn't disclose flaw,
won't replace chips.

Techy Consumer
Narrative

Understand
technology flaws,
want some type of
fix. Miffed.

Angry that replacement
policy is exclusive.

Prodromal
Sta2e

Confused about what to
believe. How often could
a mathematical error
occur?
Angry Intel won't
respond like other
consumer product
companies and offer
recall out of the gate.
Beyond crisis. Waiting to
see how Intel responds.

Crisis Resolution
Stage

No-Questions-Asked
Policy Announced
Continues to minimize
and trivialize, but offers
new policy to
consumers.
Relieved, but irritated it
took so long. Want new
chips.

Want new chips.

Adapted from Crisis Phases by Fink, 1986.
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The Role ofthe Internet
In answering Question Two, this thesis asks: Using narrative criticism, what
impact did the Internet play in transforming consumer dissatisfaction into a serious
public issue? In short, the Intel Pentium chip crisis appears to be one ofthe first
crises to have initiated over the Internet:
Public awareness ofthe Pentium chip flaw began on the Internet with a
posted message from Dr. Thomas Nicely, Professor ofMathematics at Lynchberg
College in Lynchberg, Virginia. The message described in detail Nicely' s research
into the mathematical errors encountered when using the Pentium chip. Nicely
encouraged others to run their own tests using his source code to verify the flaw.
This post was significant because it was the "trigger event" ofthe Intel crisis.
Without the Internet, Nicely would not have had such a venue in which to
communicate his findings or request others to verify his results that would ultimately
lead to a public forum.
The Internet was the conference room ofthe Techy Consumer's community.
Those Techies who were up to Nicely's challenge posted their results in the virtual
"conference room" ofinstant information for others to see. The Internet providee:i a
forum for Techies to chat in various newsgroups about the flaw and to develop
strategies for coping, fixing, or gaining replacement chips. The Internet also became
the war room, where Techies who encountered or challenged Intel's return policy
told stories ofbattle. The Pentium chip crisis was born on the Internet and became a
serious public issue because ofthe medium. The banter about the Pentium chip flaw
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had been occurring for weeks on the Internet prior to mainstream media coverage.
Approximately 130,000 computer users visited the comp.sys.intel newsgroup in
autumn 1994, with approximately 1,000 ofthem commenting about the Pentium
chip flaw (Ziegler & Sandberg, 1994, p. B3).
lt is safe to say that the Intel Pentium chip flaw would not have evolved into
a crisis situation without the Internet. The Internet is a powerfiil medium because it
provides a forum ofcommunication that includes response and feedback, and a
vehicle by which individuals who would otherwise never meet have an opportunity
to do so due to their common interests. In 1994, companies, even including
computer technology oriented companies such as Intel, were not prepared to
harness the power ofthis new communications tool, nor were they prepared for the
damage it could cause. Ifthe Internet had not been available for Professor Nicely to
post his results and gain responses, other people may not have caught wind ofthe
potential Pentium chip flaw. Additionally, Andy Grove (or a colleague posing as
Andy Grove) would not have rushed to give his opinion, nor would his opinion ever
be likely to appear in its füll context in traditional media editorial.

As the

crisis

continued, Pentium chip users turned to the Internet as a source ofinformation and
as a place to share stories about their personal experiences ofattempting to replace
their Pentium chips through Intel. Overall, the Internet propelled the Pentium chip
flaw from a private, technological debate for those who possessed "true knowledge"
into a serious public issue that was adjudicated in the public marketplace ofideas by
Techy and General Consumers alike. lt was because ofthe Internet discussions that
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the traditional media discovered the issue and it was also the Internet that provided a
forum for dissatisfied customers to keep the crisis alive.
Restoration Strategies
One purpose of this study was to use narrative criticism as a means to
determine what restoration strategies were successful in helping Intel to maintain or
restore its credibility in the industry and with the general public. As studied by
Benoit and Brinson (1994), restoration strategies are used by organizations to
restore their images once they undergo a threat to their reputation, whether it is pre
crisis, during, or post-crisis. Intel utilized four strategies to restore its image with
consumers: (1) taking responsibility by disclosing the flaw; (2) minimization by
repeatedly arguing that the average user would be unaffected; (3) corrective action,
first with an "as-needed" product return policy, then a "no questions asked" policy,
and finally the new disclosure standards; and (4) mortification through lntel's two
apologies: first on the Internet; and then in the print advertisement.
According to Hearit (1999), the use of mortification is effective due to the
fact that it is fulfilling public expectations while completing the "cycle of charge,
guilt, and restoration" (p. 297). Intel used its apology in two instances. First was
with Grove's Internet post, where he apologized for the anxiety the flaw had caused
and then announced the paternalistic replacement policy of "prove you need it and
we'll consider your request." The second use of apology followed IBM's allegation
that the Pentium error would not occur once every 27,000 years but once every 24
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days for the average user. Given the consumer doubt that IBM's announcement
created, Intel had no other choice but to apologize for its previous policy and to
institute a "no questions asked" return policy. This announcement, unlike a semi
private Internet post, was published in The New York Times and The Wall Street

Journal. Once the new return policy and the apology were in place, the crisis was
over, for the narrative ofthe story had nowhere eise to go. Upon the announcement
ofthe new policy-in spite ofthe considerable costs it would incur-Intel's stock
price rose more than $3 a share, proving that consumers were satisfied and the
narrative was complete. The Intel story finally presented a "conclusion" that ended
the story.
Even though Intel implemented several restoration strategies and apologies
during the crisis, I am not convinced that it was the effect ofany ofthese which
enabled Intel to maintain its credibility. Ultimately, Intel provided consumers with
what they demanded-new, flawless Pentium chips. Perhaps this case was like all
product flaws that do not harm, but instead inconvenience or simply anger; once the
problem has been resolved it is quickly forgotten. As one ofthe few companies
providing microprocessors, Intel still offers a product consumers demand and have a
difficult time finding elsewhere.
Organizations and the Internet
Since the occurrence oflntel Pentium chip crisis in 1994, the Internet has
become more than a forum for Techy Consumers or a marketing tool for companies.
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As predicted, the Internet is ultimately becoming the "information superhighway''
for those who have access to it. The Intel Pentium chip crisis provides organizations
with a case study in what not to do in a crisis. More importantly, this thesis has
raised a larger question: How should organizations address criticism that emanates
from the Internet?
One of the primary purposes of this study was to provide a model of
reference for organizations that may also face crises that stem from the Internet.
Overall, it seems that the basics of crisis communication theory apply: listen,
understand, and then respond. However, valuable lessons beyond these commonly
held ideas can be learned from the Intel Pentium chip crisis. First, identity on the
Internet is not a given and fakery is often the norm. Consequently, tremendous care
must be taken to make sure information is credible and verifiable. Second, the
Internet is a powerfiil medium and as such it provides organizations a vehicle for
early warning signs that issues are arising. Companies should use boundary-spanners
to access the information that is becoming available about their products on the
Internet-be it good or ill. By doing so, they will find they are ultimately using the
Internet as a benchmark, instead ofjust another place to disseminate marketing
messages. Companies should also walk away from the Pentium chip crisis knowing
that using the Internet as a communications forum can backfire, as it did for Grove.
In the end, the Intel Pentium chip crisis seriously impacted technological
matters in two significant areas: (1) it demonstrated the maturity of the Internet as a
viable communication medium, and (2) it propelled the industry to adopt new
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computer industry standards for communicating "bugs" or flaws. First, it served the
purpose ofpositioning the Internet as a viable communications medium.
Organizations will have to monitor the Internet carefully and be prepared to respond
to both legitimate and illegitimate criticism at a moment's notice (Ross, 1995).
Second, the Pentium chip crisis resulted in new industry standards. Carlton and
Yoder (1994) summarized the overall impact ofintel's new return policy: "More
broadly, Intel's move to institute a no-questions-asked return policy, set a new and
perhaps costly standard for corporations that sell complex computer gear and
software" (p. BI). As a result ofthe Pentium chip crisis, Intel now publishes all
known product issues on its website and provides the information under each
product name (support.intel.com). Although the intended audience for this
information is Intel-direct customers or manufacturers such as Dell, Intel makes the
information available to anyone who accesses its website. Instead ofhiding its
mistakes, Intel has gone to the opposite extreme, "errata" disclosure ("errata" is the
Latin word for "mistake," disclosing all known errors). For example, on Intel's
website under the support section for software development ofthe Intel® JPEG
library, there is an Errata section which describes a known problem and offers a
solution to work around it. Occasionally, posted errors may affect the average
consumer and media will publicize the flaw, but nothing has matched the severity of
the Pentium chip to date. As a result, other technology companies such as Microsoft
are also using errata disclosure.
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Narrative Criticism and Crises
Narratives order and present a view by describing a situation that involves
characters, actions, and settings that change over time. They are told in a logical
order in a continuum that is unproblematic (Mitchell, 1980). The value ofnarrative
is its ability to help make sense ofreality (Mitchell). Accordingly, I have examined
the Intel Pentium chip crisis as a narrative, a story being told through the media. As
a critic using narrative theory, I established my own criteria by which to examine the
Intel crisis narrative. The criteria included the examination ofthe characters, the
dialog, the media, the messages, and the effect ofthe multiple narratives that were
discovered.
After examining the merits ofthe Intel crisis, it was helpful to dissect the
crisis as a narrative. By doing so, I was able to gain a better understanding ofthe
significance ofwhat had been said and by whom. I also was able to view a crisis as a
"story'' unfolding through the media. The narrative perspective provided insight into
the different messages and how they were presented via the media.
Rhetorical criticism searches for the purpose ofspecific rhetoric and
attempts to determine ifit was successful in meeting that purpose. When reviewing
Intel's rhetoric during the crisis, one can initially conclude that Intel failed in its
attempts to prevent a national product replacement effort. However, when looking
at the potential impact the crisis could have had on the organization' s ability to
thrive or its financial stability, Intel' s final narrative may be viewed as successful, if
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für no other reason than it completed the "story'' and got the company' s name out
ofthe media.
On the flip side is the consumer' s narrative, which served the purpose of
getting replacement chips without questions asked. The consumer' s goal was
achieved, and therefüre could be interpreted as successful in meeting its purpose.
Further, the amount oftime it took to achieve its purpose, in combination with the
number ofmedia needed to provoke Intel into the "no questions asked" policy
demonstrates the power and influence words can have, ultimately fürcing a company
to issue a two billion dollar recall.
Overall, Intel's story demonstrates how difficult it is für technology
companies with their socially constructed technological rationalities to successfully
communicate within the non-technical marketplace. Intel' s story accentuates a
marketing communication fundamental oftailoring the message to be congruent
with the target audience mindset.
Conclusion
In the end, Intel's patemalistic stance was unable to persuade consumers
through technical rationality that the Pentium chip flaw was nothing to worry about.
And although no one brought their computers back, Intel was fürced to listen to the
consumer narrative and respond to its demands. As the saying goes, "the squeaky
wheel gets the grease." Had Intel responded to the consumer narrative initially and
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stopped trying to force its narrative, perhaps the amount of negative publicity could
have been minimized. So too could the duration of the entire crisis.
lt is not that the consumer is always right, but when a company finds a
product flaw, appears to be hiding it, minimizes the potential impact it could have,
and then trivializes customers' demands regarding the product flaw, then the
company is propelling itself toward an unnecessary crisis. The Intel Pentium chip
crisis is paradigmatic of how technology issues are enacted, and wams against
assuming that the technology is always right, and not the user.
By undertaking this criticism, some lessons have been leamed which can
impact the effectiveness of communication by organizations who find themselves
within self-perpetuated crises. First, be honest. Intel looked guilty from the
beginning because its patemalistic stance made it appear to have attempted to hide
the flaw. Second, realize that communicating "the facts" is appropriate, but it does
not reduce emotional fear. Intel continued to repeat the fact that the flaw would not
affect the average user, but users did not care. There was an emotional fear attached
to the possibility that the flaw could unknowingly impact mathematical calculations.
Third, consumers are not willing to use products that put them at risk without it
being their own choice (e.g., smoking cigarettes is a health risk, but consumers
choose to smoke, whereas exposure to lead paint is also a health risk, but not a
consumer's choice).
This study is one of the first examining crisis management as a narrative.
Using the narrative method of criticism as a means for determining the strength and
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weaknesses of the messages being communicated from multiple publics by the media
during crises is a valid method for analyzing successful ways to approach crises.
Ultimately, further study using the narrative criticism method as a means to analyze
crises in the media could create new crisis models and provide a guide for
organizations on how to handle specific crisis situations.
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